Monday, July 6, 2009

The Friendly Atheist on Edwardsian Freedom:
Part 3

Rowe's second argument against Edwards' assertion that moral inability is irrelevant to moral responsibility concerns one's ability to control their will. Rowe interprets Edwards' understanding of moral responsibility to imply one's ability to influence and direct their own will (which is true). According to Edwards, it is impossible for someone to not be able to control their volitions:
And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the will, ’tis in some respect more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he can’t if he will: for to say so, is a downright contradiction: it is to say, he can’t will, if he does will. And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he has willed, the thing is performed; and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, in these things to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. (I. 4)

Edwards is saying that it is a contradiction to refer to someone as both wanting to take a drink and also wanting to not drink. Now, it is possible for someone to want a drink while desiring to not be a drunkard. But this requires the introduction of a concept which is both crucial to understanding Edwards' concept of responsibility and which is curiously absent from Rowe's analysis of Edwards. According to Jonathan Edwards, a person is free when they act according to their strongest desire at the given moment. This is central to Edwards' argument, and surprisingly missing from Rowe's chapter on Edwards. Rowe's primary second argument, then, is that:
"The question at issue is whether the agent has it in his power to will to do some particular action A. Of course, the agent may well have the power to will that he will to do A. But just as an agent who wills to do A may yet fail to do A, so an agent who wills to will to do A may yet fail to will to do A. It is clear, therefore, that there is no contradiction in someone willing that he will to do A and yet failing to will to do A" (Pg. 69).

So Rowe seems to think that someone can will something and yet not do it, but this is not how decisions are made. For Edwards, individuals have motivations, long-term goals, and desires, but our actions in any given moment are always dictated by our strongest desire at that exact moment. While it is possible for someone to want to not be a drunk while also wanting a drink, it is impossible for someone to will to drink, to have no physical constraints preventing said drinking, and for them to not take the drink. Such a scenario is inconceivable, because in terms of desire for the drink, the will must come to one decision or another; either they will to take the drink, or they will to not take the drink.

Sunday, July 5, 2009

Calvin 500 is Underway

My boss, Derek Thomas, has posted an update on the Calvin 500 over at Reformation 21. It sounds like the Lord is really blessing the preaching of these men. My prayer is that God would uses these sermons to glorify himself by building up his Church and bringing sinners to repentance. I would imagine that Dr. Thomas keeps us posted on Calvin 500 as the week goes on.

Saturday, July 4, 2009

The Josh Walker Yu-Gi-Oh Card


I found this somewhere on Facebook and thought you would all get a kick out of it. I actually wish I had one of these cards, myself.

Friday, July 3, 2009

The Friendly Atheist on Edwardsian Freedom:
Part 2

So we've seen that Rowe agrees completely with Edwards' critique of libertarian freedom. Now that he has let Edwards do the work in part one of the chapter, he turns his attention to Edwards himself. The specific position Rowe is opposing is Edwards' belief that "moral inability to refrain from willing as one did is irrelevant to the agent’s moral responsibility for so willing and acting." In other words, for Edwards, the drunk is still responsible for taking the drink even if he is unable to will to refrain from taking the drink. Rowe considers this the weakest link in Edwards' position and presents three arguments in opposition to Edwards.

Rowe's first argument against Edwards' compatiblism is that Edwards' view "is not in accord with current moral standards." He uses the Andrea Yates trial as an example of this. In 2001 Andrea Yates drowned her five children in her bathtub and attempted to use the insanity plea in her defense. Rowe rightly understands that in the compatiblist view, Andrea Yates was responsible for drowning her four children in the bathtub, even if she were mentally ill, so long as she was physically free to not drown them if she had so desired. Whether she was or was not actually found to be insane by the court (she was not) is irrelevant to the example. This seems, in Rowe's mind, to militate against what we know about the law, since the law does not punish people whom the court decides are incapable of controlling their actions.

There are several ways to respond to Rowe, but the first is to turn Rowe's criticism back on itself. He may be right that the courts do not punish the insane for their behaviors (at least in principle), but when it comes to judging those who are of their right minds, the court presumes that the actions of the individuals arose necessarily from the person's nature. According to Edwards, this implies a compatiblist understanding of responsibility.

Another response might be that current moral standards are irrelevant to the question. It may be that current moral standards say that moral inability relieves one of moral responsibility under our current system, but under the moral standards of most previous generations moral inability was neither here nor there. Why canonize the morality of the current generation and reject the morality of previous generations? Such a position seems arbitrary.

In the next part, we'll focus on Rowe's objection number two.

Waters on Wright

On Monday, Dr. Guy Waters was interviewed by Knowing the Truth radio on N.T. Wright and the audio can be found here. The callers were specifically interesting. I know of no greater model on how to handle theological disagreement than Dr. Waters. I thank God for Dr. Waters' superb example for us to follow.

Thursday, July 2, 2009

The Friendly Atheist on Edwardsian Freedom:
Part 1

My first exposure to the writings of philosopher William L. Rowe was in my college philosophy class Atheistic Argument from Evil. Rowe is actually an interesting philosopher, because though he is an atheist, he exercises charity towards theism and has even defended the cosmological argument. In his classic article on the problem of evil, Rowe coined the phrase "the friendly atheist," to describe someone (such as himself) who believes that some theists are justified in believing God even though he doesn't actually exist.

I was surprised to find that in Rowe's 2004 book Can God Be Free he actually penned a chapter on Jonathan Edwards' view of divine freedom. Rowe's general argument in the book is that the notion of divine freedom is incoherent. While I will not interact with the entire book, I want to focus on Chapter 4 of the book, "Jonathan Edwards on Divine and Human Freedom" since I have long believed Edwards' arguments to be airtight.

My general impressions of Rowe's approach are that he seems to understand Edwards' arguments in Freedom of the Will quite well. He seems to fully grasp the forcefulness of Edwards' position as well as his criticisms of the Arminian philosophers. Most of the chapter is, in essence, Rowe's summarization and subsequent agreement with Edwards' conclusions regarding the incoherence of libertarian freedom.

"It should be clear that the Arminian theologians cannot have it both ways. As proponents of libertarian freedom as essential for moral responsibility, they can’t insist that power not to will as one does is required for a willed act to be free and, therefore, one for which an agent may be morally responsible, and then proceed to declare that God is not just free, but perfectly free, when he wills of necessity to always and unfailingly do what he sees is the best to be done. For then God is a necessary agent, not a free agent. He lacks power over his will in that he is unable to will to refrain from doing what he sees is the best to be done" (Pg. 64-65).

Rowe understands the strength of Edwards' reasoning, and considers this Edwards' strongest argument. The Arminians consider God's acts to be free, and yet not free in the libertarian sense, while nevertheless considering God's acts of goodness as being praiseworthy. Rowe, who has no dog in the fight since he is an atheist, is happy to show the incoherence of libertarian freedom and divine freedom since he plans to subsequently demonstrate that Edwards' compatiblistic freedom is also incompatible with divine freedom. One take on this chapter of the book is that he lets Edwards do the heavy lifting by decimating the libertarian position, all the while planning to do the same to Edwards before the conclusion of the chapter. The question is, how does he plan to do it?

To Be Continued

John Calvin: For a New Reformation

In Honor of John Calvin's 500th birthday, Derek Thomas and John Tweeddale have put together a new volume on this great Reformer titled John Calvin: For a New Reformation. The aim of this new edition, according to the editors "is to provide a comprehensive, one-volume introduction to the life, teaching, and legacy of Calvin to serve as both a primer for those who have never read him and as a resource for students of Reformed theology." This book is available now for pre-order at Amazon.com. This book will make for a great read or a nice gift for your favorite blogger (hint, hint).

Helm on Wright

Paul Helm has started a new series of posts interacting and responding to N.T. Wright’s new book on justification (Justification: God’s Plan and Paul’s Vision), which can be found here. The following quote I found very helpful. This critique of Wright goes far beyond Wright. The attitude Wright shows for tradition, according to Helm, is the predominant view held by most in the Church today, including those in the Reformed world.

"On tradition, the bishop has curious views. He routinely thinks of tradition as constraining what is thought in the present, and so anything ‘traditional’ must be rejected or at least viewed with suspicion. (eg 135, 223, and many other places.) But a rejection of all tradition seems unbiblical and in any case tends to lead to the reinvention of the wheel. Why does a traditional view, if it is a correct view, not inform and liberate? The resurrection of Jesus, is that not 'traditional'? He writes of ‘refreshing’ the tradition, and this could mean merely smartening it up, or replacing it with a fresh view. He does not say which. It is as if semper reformanda, together with the mantra that the Lord has yet more light and truth to break forth from his Holy Word, are phrases which warrant a never-ending research project. The idea that we need a continuous stream of fresh readings of Paul, newer and newer new perspectives, is both wearying and scary. (13)"

Wednesday, July 1, 2009

Review of The Law is Not of Faith


Mark Jones, over at his blog, just posted a review of The Law is Not of Faith, which I have read and will review in the coming weeks. Anyhow, anyone who is interested in the book would be remiss not to read this helpful review. Jones concludes his review with these words:


"To argue that the giving of the law at Sinai has similarities with the covenant of works is not, to my mind, controversial in Reformed circles. To argue that a meritorious works-principle operated at the typological level in the Mosaic covenant – because Sinai is viewed as a law covenant – is, however, a serious point of contention. The Lutherans and some of our Reformed brethren may be right about Moses; but TLNF has perhaps raised more questions than it answers. That is not a necessarily a bad thing, of course. Therefore, I hope that future discussions on this topic will be enhanced because of this work; and perhaps, on a lesser level, my own review will provide the authors of TLNF with some further food for thought."

Make War

Top Commentaries by Mathison

Over the past several months Keith Mathison has put together a list of the best commentaries on each book of the Bible. His list is final complete and can be found here. I find lists like this one very helpful. Like many, I often find it difficult to know exactly which commentaries to use for which book of the Bible. With lists like this (also see Derek Thomas' book) it helps remove the guess work in buying and using commentaries.

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Bucey on Modern Reformation

I found this article by Camden Bucey on Feeding on Christ to be interesting, so I wanted to pass it along. It does seem interesting that Modern Reformation, which is associated with Mike Horton, would have a Roman Catholic write an article on a view of Calvin's doctrine of union with Christ that is seemingly different than Horton's. I was wondering if they were trying to paint Richard Gaffin's view, set forth here, as Roman Catholic, which makes one wonder.

Saturday, June 27, 2009

God's Happiness: Self-Knowledge

It's always nice to make a discovery of connections between two beautiful things that we already thought we understood but never put together before. In this case, I have long known that God is infinitely happy and taken great joy in knowing that He is the most joyful person in the entire universe; in fact, He is the fountain of all joy.

I have also intellectually ascertained for years now that God has perfect knowledge; when reading the right systematic theology I have long understood that God has not only perfect knowledge of the universe which He made, but He also has perfect self-knowledge.

"The Father, Son, and Spirit search one another's hearts (1 Cor. 2:10-11). God knows himself exhaustively. We creatures do not have perfect self-knowledge. But there are no unexplored depths in God's nature. He does not surprise Himself. He is word. His word exhaustively expresses his being to himself, among the persons of the Trinity. Our God has perfect knowledge of who he is and of what he does." (Frame, John M. The Doctrine of God; Page 474-5)

My error has been my understanding of the source of God's joyfulness. I have always chocked up the source of God's joyfulness to his providence; to the fact that His will always occurs. But there was another aspect of God's joyfulness which eluded me, and that is His self-knowledge. For the Biblically-minded and regenerate person, there is no greater joy than knowing God and learning more and more about Him, because He continually marvels us and there are never new vistas of understanding which we will not find as we grow closer and closer to Him throughout eternity. This is a profound source of joy for the redeemed.

But consider how joyful such knowledge would make one if such knowledge could be perfect or exhaustive! While we humans, as we come to know ourselves, we come to understand more deeply our flaws and limitations. In the case of humanity, this is a source of sorrow and consternation. God's self-knowledge would be the exact inverse of this. Who can even begin to reflect on the joy which would result from perfectly knowing such an infinitely admirable and perfect person?

And so God is not only infinitely joyful because of His providence and the perfect fulfillment of His will at all times, but He is joyful also because He exhaustively knows Himself, and there is no greater joy for anyone than to know God.

I'm pretty sure my memory is simply faulty, and I am certain that I am walking where Jonathan Edwards has already tread in his Unpublished Essay on the Trinity. No new insights here, just something I've been chewing on, this fine morning.

Friday, June 26, 2009

Maybe I Should Be Post-Millennial

After watching this video, I was forced to rethink my eschatology. But at the end, I stayed right where I was.

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Sermons by Jonathan Goundry

As many of you know, Jonathan Goundry is one of the bloggers here at Bring the Books. But what you might not know is that Jonathan is also an elder at Great Oak Baptist Church. His sermons preached there (and elsewhere I presume) can be found here. I would recommend giving them a listen. Jonathan is a great communicator and solid in his understanding of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Well worth the time spent!