I am currently celebrating my tenth wedding anniversary with my wife and have not, as of yet, had an opportunity to read Manata's paper on the subject, but I am looking forward to the coming days when I will get to see how Manata interacts with both theologians past, as well as theologians present. You can find Manata's paper at his blog: here.
Showing posts with label Compatiblism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Compatiblism. Show all posts
Friday, July 22, 2011
Manata on Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Reformed Tradition
Paul Manata has written a paper discussing the subject of Free Will and Moral Responsibility, especially focusing on the Reformed tradition. Much to my delight, he spends some time interacting with so-called "Reformed Libertarianism," which Richard Muller seems to see within the Reformed tradition. Much of my satisfaction with Manata's interaction in this respect touches on the fact that I had some brief thoughts awhile back regarding Muller's reading of Jonathan Edwards as creating a divergence within the Reformed schools of thought on this very subject.
Tuesday, January 22, 2008
My Birthday Presents; Berkhof on Compatiblism
For my birthday, my wife got me the following:
1. Louis Berkhof's Systematic Theology; a book I have long desired for many many years. Now I have it, and the depths of resources I now have are abundant, indeed.
2. The Velvet Underground & Nico (Vinyl LP); The very first Velvet Underground album on a beautifully printed yellow vinyl. It is a real treasure, and one of those albums that every music lover should own on vinyl, for sure.
Thanks for my birthday presents, sweetie!
On to business: I found a wonderful quote from Berkhof which relates somewhat to the more recent discussions taking place here at Bring the Books.
1. Louis Berkhof's Systematic Theology; a book I have long desired for many many years. Now I have it, and the depths of resources I now have are abundant, indeed.
2. The Velvet Underground & Nico (Vinyl LP); The very first Velvet Underground album on a beautifully printed yellow vinyl. It is a real treasure, and one of those albums that every music lover should own on vinyl, for sure.
Thanks for my birthday presents, sweetie!
On to business: I found a wonderful quote from Berkhof which relates somewhat to the more recent discussions taking place here at Bring the Books.
It may be said that the Bible certainly does not proceed on the assumption that the divine decree is inconsistent with the free agency of man. It clearly reveals that God has decreed the free acts of man, but also that the actors are none the less free and therefore responsible for their acts, Gen. 50:19,20; Acts 2:23; 4:27,28. It was determined that the Jews should bring about the crucifixion of Jesus; yet they were perfectly free in their wicked course of action, and were held responsible for this crime. There is not a single indication in Scripture that the inspired writers are conscious of a contradiction in connection with these matters. They never make an attempt to harmonize the two. This may restrain us from assuming a contradiction here, even if we cannot reconcile both truths. (Pg. 106)
Compatiblistic Freedom (Part 4): Does God Sovereignly Limit His Sovereignty?
In a discussion on my blog for Compatiblistic Freedom (Part 2) we have been discussing libertarian freedom. A response was given by Heretic to something I said which I think deserves further thought. He said:
Now, what Heretic means by that is, he believe that God is so powerful he could create something over which he has no power (namely, the human will). Another way of stating this is that he believes God is so powerful that He can actually choose to limit his power. I think this is a fair restatement that he would not contest.
So, we are left with a difficult question regarding something which I hear so often from believers in libertarian freedom that it does deserve some attention; namely this idea that a sovereign being such as God can use His sovereignty to limit His sovereignty.
My initial reaction to this idea is to brush it off, because it seems so obviously contradictory. However, so many people have, over the years, said this in one form or another to me that I think it deserves at least a cursory discussion in my Compatiblism series.
My primary approach to this shall be to demonstrate that sovereignly limited sovereignty is contradictory. First of all, a definition of sovereignty that won't make Heretic squirm:
The theological dictionary from Carm.org defines sovereignty thusly:
My argument is that Heretic's position [God's sovereignty entails the possibility of not being sovereign] is inherently contradictory.
This is a contradiction. It's at this point that I call upon Heretic to give up his position, but that is unlikely. Rather, I would challenge our readers to not follow this modernistic tendency to make up ideas about God limiting himself when the Bible says nothing of the sort. I know Walker will have something else to say about this, so I will leave it to him, in the meantime, because I know his own post is forthcoming.
"The doctrine of the sovereignty of God is the doctrine that gives means and substance to all other doctrines." - J.M. Boice
"It is not merely that God has the power and right to govern all things but that He does so always and without exception." - John Piper
I'd prefer to believe that in God's omnipotence he could create a person IN HIS IMAGE.
Now, what Heretic means by that is, he believe that God is so powerful he could create something over which he has no power (namely, the human will). Another way of stating this is that he believes God is so powerful that He can actually choose to limit his power. I think this is a fair restatement that he would not contest.
So, we are left with a difficult question regarding something which I hear so often from believers in libertarian freedom that it does deserve some attention; namely this idea that a sovereign being such as God can use His sovereignty to limit His sovereignty.
My initial reaction to this idea is to brush it off, because it seems so obviously contradictory. However, so many people have, over the years, said this in one form or another to me that I think it deserves at least a cursory discussion in my Compatiblism series.
My primary approach to this shall be to demonstrate that sovereignly limited sovereignty is contradictory. First of all, a definition of sovereignty that won't make Heretic squirm:
The theological dictionary from Carm.org defines sovereignty thusly:
The right of God to do as He wishes (Psalm 50:1; Isaiah 40:15; 1 Tim. 6:15) with His creation. This implies that there is no external influence upon Him and that He also has the ability to exercise His power and control according to His will.
My argument is that Heretic's position [God's sovereignty entails the possibility of not being sovereign] is inherently contradictory.
1. God is sovereign.
2. If God's sovereignty entails the possibility to also not be sovereign then God is both sovereign and also not sovereign
3. Therefore God is not sovereign.
This is a contradiction. It's at this point that I call upon Heretic to give up his position, but that is unlikely. Rather, I would challenge our readers to not follow this modernistic tendency to make up ideas about God limiting himself when the Bible says nothing of the sort. I know Walker will have something else to say about this, so I will leave it to him, in the meantime, because I know his own post is forthcoming.
"The doctrine of the sovereignty of God is the doctrine that gives means and substance to all other doctrines." - J.M. Boice
"It is not merely that God has the power and right to govern all things but that He does so always and without exception." - John Piper
Friday, January 11, 2008
Compatiblistic Freedom (Part 3): The Incoherence of Libertarian Freedom (Part 2)
In part two of my argument against Libertarian freedom, I ask permission to regurgitate a rather profound argument offered by Jonathan Edwards in his previously mentioned Freedom of the Will.
Essentially, Libertarians argue that their particular form of freedom is necessary in order for someone to be punished and or rewarded. They say that if the causation of their actions did not arise from a Libertarian context (i.e. without necessary causation preceding its occurrence), then the act was not done freely; and if the act was not done freely (so the reasoning goes) then their acts cannot be judged.
Edwards argues by turning this idea on its head: if volitions must be uncaused in order for one to be worthy of praise or blame, then it is the Libertarian system which actually makes praise or blame impossible. This is because, in the Compatiblistic schema, people are judged because their actions arise from their nature. But if actions arise from an uncaused volition, then the nature of the criminal can not be brought into question. After all, their nature was not the sufficient cause of their actions.
The legal system puts this notion into practice. Part of the reason we send violent criminals away (in many cases) for life is that they are the types of people whose natures are such that they are believed capable of killing or harming others again. When people do bad things, in other words, we take it for granted that this is because they are bad people. Their natures are such that their proclivity to kill may again result in harm being done. We make an assumption of the truth of this in everyday life. Now, if the legal system proceeded in a Libertarian fashion, every action would be assessed on its own merits (which should certainly be done), but without a view to future harm the individual is believed fully capable of. If the individual's nature does not sufficiently determine their actions, we are not even justified in assessing a moral value to the person's actions, precisely because said actions did not necessarily arise from their nature.
If this line of argumentation is valid, then given the notion of Libertarian freedom, it is impossible to assign a moral value to anyone's actions. This is again another example of how Libertarian freedom is an incoherent version of freedom. I again offer up that the Compatiblistic notion of freedom is not only coherent, but that in contrast to the Libertarian system of freedom, it is most evident from reason as well as the Scriptures (examined in Part 1 of this blog series).
Essentially, Libertarians argue that their particular form of freedom is necessary in order for someone to be punished and or rewarded. They say that if the causation of their actions did not arise from a Libertarian context (i.e. without necessary causation preceding its occurrence), then the act was not done freely; and if the act was not done freely (so the reasoning goes) then their acts cannot be judged.
Edwards argues by turning this idea on its head: if volitions must be uncaused in order for one to be worthy of praise or blame, then it is the Libertarian system which actually makes praise or blame impossible. This is because, in the Compatiblistic schema, people are judged because their actions arise from their nature. But if actions arise from an uncaused volition, then the nature of the criminal can not be brought into question. After all, their nature was not the sufficient cause of their actions.
The legal system puts this notion into practice. Part of the reason we send violent criminals away (in many cases) for life is that they are the types of people whose natures are such that they are believed capable of killing or harming others again. When people do bad things, in other words, we take it for granted that this is because they are bad people. Their natures are such that their proclivity to kill may again result in harm being done. We make an assumption of the truth of this in everyday life. Now, if the legal system proceeded in a Libertarian fashion, every action would be assessed on its own merits (which should certainly be done), but without a view to future harm the individual is believed fully capable of. If the individual's nature does not sufficiently determine their actions, we are not even justified in assessing a moral value to the person's actions, precisely because said actions did not necessarily arise from their nature.
If this line of argumentation is valid, then given the notion of Libertarian freedom, it is impossible to assign a moral value to anyone's actions. This is again another example of how Libertarian freedom is an incoherent version of freedom. I again offer up that the Compatiblistic notion of freedom is not only coherent, but that in contrast to the Libertarian system of freedom, it is most evident from reason as well as the Scriptures (examined in Part 1 of this blog series).
Compatiblistic Freedom (Part 2): The Incoherence of Libertarian Freedom
In the philosophical world, discussions of human freedom can be heated, difficult, and complex. Most of the time, in the Christian world, thinkers come down in favor of one of three possible positions: Hard Determinism, Libertarianism, and Soft Determinism (or Compatiblism, as I will be calling it here). I will do what I can, here, to demonstrate that Libertarian freedom is an incoherent philosophical position. Let me first say, however, that anything I say here is dwarfed by Jonathan Edwards' brilliant tome (which to my knowledge has never been adequately answered) in defense of compatiblism, The Freedom of the Will. Written while Edwards ministered to the indians at Stockbridge, Mark A. Knoll once stated that Edwards' book single-handedly restrained the spread of Arminianism in the American colonies for nearly a hundred years. That being said, few have the patience for Edwards' difficult language and meaty philosophical rigor. I say all of this because, truly, if Libertarian freedom is to be an academically acceptable notion, it must be able to tackle Edwards' arguments, and I believe this still has yet to be done.
On with my arguments against Libertarian freedom:
Compatiblists define freedom as "being able to do whatever one desires at any given moment." Libertarians, in contrast, define freedom as "being able to do otherwise than what one actually does."
1. For Libertarianism to be true, the will must be able to make decisions contrary to prior inclinations. This is because in order for the will to be free in the libertarian sense, it must be arbitrary and turn in the face of preceding causes. For example, it must be possible for someone to be presented with two choices and have either choice be equally probable that either could be chosen. However, this is incoherent, because everyone always has a prior reason for the decisions that they make, whether it be disposition at the moment, instilled moral code, or simple preference at the time of decision. This leads in somewhat to my second argument.
2. For Libertarianism to be true, it must be possible for a volition to occur without a cause to its existence. The reason this is so is that if a volition has a prior cause, then the volition could never have been otherwise than what that prior cause had determined. In other words, in a Libertarian schema, Dave may at the given moment prefer chocolate and yet still decide to take the vanilla instead. But this makes no sense. It is literally a contradiction to say that at the given moment Dave's strongest desire was for chocolate, but his strongest desire was for vanilla. Some may say, "But that happens all the time. Sometimes people just want something different or want to 'mix it up.' " However, the question we must come back to is "Why?" Why did Dave pick the vanilla instead? It is because (though he had a prior preference of chocolate) his desire was strongest at that moment (for whatever reason) to try vanilla. This is classic Compatiblistic free will at work. Our decisions are always conditioned by something, and if our decisions are never free of prior causation, then Libertarian freedom is again, as I have charged, incoherent.
I should point out, again, that God's certain foreknowledge of future events (and human decisions in particular) renders Libertarian freedom impossible. The very existence of Open Theists, I would surmise, is evidence that one must deny God's exhaustive foreknowledge of future free human decisions in order to preserve and consistently protect this philosophical notion of Libertarian free will. I could use many other arguments, (examples include Edwards' argument that every effect has a necessary and sufficient cause of its existence) but this is a blog and not a book, so for now I will end with a quote from Edwards which, in my view, sums up the absurdity of the Libertarian position:
On with my arguments against Libertarian freedom:
Compatiblists define freedom as "being able to do whatever one desires at any given moment." Libertarians, in contrast, define freedom as "being able to do otherwise than what one actually does."
1. For Libertarianism to be true, the will must be able to make decisions contrary to prior inclinations. This is because in order for the will to be free in the libertarian sense, it must be arbitrary and turn in the face of preceding causes. For example, it must be possible for someone to be presented with two choices and have either choice be equally probable that either could be chosen. However, this is incoherent, because everyone always has a prior reason for the decisions that they make, whether it be disposition at the moment, instilled moral code, or simple preference at the time of decision. This leads in somewhat to my second argument.
2. For Libertarianism to be true, it must be possible for a volition to occur without a cause to its existence. The reason this is so is that if a volition has a prior cause, then the volition could never have been otherwise than what that prior cause had determined. In other words, in a Libertarian schema, Dave may at the given moment prefer chocolate and yet still decide to take the vanilla instead. But this makes no sense. It is literally a contradiction to say that at the given moment Dave's strongest desire was for chocolate, but his strongest desire was for vanilla. Some may say, "But that happens all the time. Sometimes people just want something different or want to 'mix it up.' " However, the question we must come back to is "Why?" Why did Dave pick the vanilla instead? It is because (though he had a prior preference of chocolate) his desire was strongest at that moment (for whatever reason) to try vanilla. This is classic Compatiblistic free will at work. Our decisions are always conditioned by something, and if our decisions are never free of prior causation, then Libertarian freedom is again, as I have charged, incoherent.
I should point out, again, that God's certain foreknowledge of future events (and human decisions in particular) renders Libertarian freedom impossible. The very existence of Open Theists, I would surmise, is evidence that one must deny God's exhaustive foreknowledge of future free human decisions in order to preserve and consistently protect this philosophical notion of Libertarian free will. I could use many other arguments, (examples include Edwards' argument that every effect has a necessary and sufficient cause of its existence) but this is a blog and not a book, so for now I will end with a quote from Edwards which, in my view, sums up the absurdity of the Libertarian position:
It is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the Will should come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a Cause. And if once we allow, that such a sort of effect as Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too?" (Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will Part II Sect. III)
Monday, January 7, 2008
Compatiblistic Freedom (Part 1): Abundant Examples from the Scriptures
God willed that Absalom lie with David’s wives.
God willed that Jesus should be crucified.
What man determines never comes to pass unless God determines it.
God is said to determine a man’s life, and also the length of his life.
King Sihon’s folly of attacking Israel was willed by God.
God ordered the sin and folly of the kings of Canaan in their opposition to Israel.
God willed that the Egyptians should hate God’s people.
God willed that Jacob’s brothers sell him into slavery.
God causes disasters.
There it is. The Scriptures teach over and over and over again that free agents act of their own accord AND by God's command, simultaneously. Their sins are judged independently, irrespective of their ultimate source. This IS what compatiblistic freedom teaches, and my confidence in the truth of it is reinforced when I see the sort of things Scripture says regarding God's dealings with men. Remember: the question is not whether or not people make choices; the question is "Why do people make the choices they make?".
Compatiblistic freedom (or "soft determinism") teaches that God is sovereignly in control of everything in this world, including the thoughts and actions of men. But it also teaches that when men think and act, they are responsible for those actions, because they are free to do whatever they want. Some may not like that all men want to do is sin, and therefore are judged accordingly [*cough* "Heretic" *cough*]. However, we all, nevertheless, act as we want. No one does anything against their wills. Boom. Compatiblistic freedom. Booyashakah. You best check yourself before you wreck yourself.
Coming Soon: A Philosophical Presentation of Compatiblism.
[Speaking to David] “Thus says the Lord, ‘Behold, I will raise up adversity against you from your own house; and I will take your wives before your eyes and give them to your neighbor, and he shall lie with your wives in the sight of this sun. For you did it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel, before the sun’” (2 Samuel 12:11-12). [Note: Though God hates fornication and adultery, He is said to have raised Absalom up to do exactly that. Also note, God says, "I will do this."]
God willed that Jesus should be crucified.
“This man, delivered over by the predetermined plan and foreknowledge of God, you nailed to a cross by the hands of godless men and put Him to death” (Acts 2:23). “For truly in this city there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom You anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose predestined to occur” (4:28). (Note: the crucifixion of Christ was the greatest of all mankind’s sins, for Christ was the only innocent person in all of the world, and yet these verses show us that God willed that the crucifixion take place.)
What man determines never comes to pass unless God determines it.
“Who is he who speaks and it comes to pass, unless the Lord has commanded it?” (Lamentations 3:37).
God is said to determine a man’s life, and also the length of his life.
“Is not man forced to labor on earth, and are not his days like the days of a hired man?” (Job 7:1). “Since his days are determined, the number of his months is with you; and his limits You have set so that he cannot pass” (14:5). (Note: “If the limits of men’s lives are determined, men’s free actions must be determined, and even their sins; for their lives depend on such acts.” Jonathan Edwards)
King Sihon’s folly of attacking Israel was willed by God.
“But Sihon king of Heshbon was not willing for us to pass through the land; for the Lord your God hardened his spirit and made his heart obstinate, in order to deliver him into your hand, as he is today” (Deuteronomy 2:30). (Note: Sihon’s opposition to Israel was a sin, yet it was willed by God.)
God ordered the sin and folly of the kings of Canaan in their opposition to Israel.
“For it was of the Lord to harden their hearts, to meet Israel in battle in order that he might utterly destroy them, that they might receive no mercy, but that he might destroy them, just as the Lord had commanded Moses” (Joshua 11:20).
God willed that the Egyptians should hate God’s people.
“He increased His people greatly, and made them stronger than their enemies. He turned their hearts to hate His people, to deal craftily with His servants” (Psalm 105:25). (Note: God willed that they hate His people, and yet God judged them for this great sin.)
God willed that Jacob’s brothers sell him into slavery.
“God sent me before you to preserve for you a remnant in the earth, and to keep you alive by a great deliverance. Now, therefore, it was not you who sent me here, but God” (Genesis 45:7-8). “[God] sent a man before them – Joseph – who was sold as a slave” (Psalm 105:17). (Note: Though God hated the sin of Joseph’s brothers, He still willed that Joseph be sold into slavery.)
God causes disasters.
"Does disaster come to a city, unless the Lord has done it?" (Amos 3:6). This doesn't demonstrate compatiblism, but it is, nonetheless, a hard saying of Scripture with regard to God's providence.
There it is. The Scriptures teach over and over and over again that free agents act of their own accord AND by God's command, simultaneously. Their sins are judged independently, irrespective of their ultimate source. This IS what compatiblistic freedom teaches, and my confidence in the truth of it is reinforced when I see the sort of things Scripture says regarding God's dealings with men. Remember: the question is not whether or not people make choices; the question is "Why do people make the choices they make?".
Compatiblistic freedom (or "soft determinism") teaches that God is sovereignly in control of everything in this world, including the thoughts and actions of men. But it also teaches that when men think and act, they are responsible for those actions, because they are free to do whatever they want. Some may not like that all men want to do is sin, and therefore are judged accordingly [*cough* "Heretic" *cough*]. However, we all, nevertheless, act as we want. No one does anything against their wills. Boom. Compatiblistic freedom. Booyashakah. You best check yourself before you wreck yourself.
Coming Soon: A Philosophical Presentation of Compatiblism.
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