Friday, January 11, 2008

Compatiblistic Freedom (Part 2): The Incoherence of Libertarian Freedom

In the philosophical world, discussions of human freedom can be heated, difficult, and complex. Most of the time, in the Christian world, thinkers come down in favor of one of three possible positions: Hard Determinism, Libertarianism, and Soft Determinism (or Compatiblism, as I will be calling it here). I will do what I can, here, to demonstrate that Libertarian freedom is an incoherent philosophical position. Let me first say, however, that anything I say here is dwarfed by Jonathan Edwards' brilliant tome (which to my knowledge has never been adequately answered) in defense of compatiblism, The Freedom of the Will. Written while Edwards ministered to the indians at Stockbridge, Mark A. Knoll once stated that Edwards' book single-handedly restrained the spread of Arminianism in the American colonies for nearly a hundred years. That being said, few have the patience for Edwards' difficult language and meaty philosophical rigor. I say all of this because, truly, if Libertarian freedom is to be an academically acceptable notion, it must be able to tackle Edwards' arguments, and I believe this still has yet to be done.

On with my arguments against Libertarian freedom:

Compatiblists define freedom as "being able to do whatever one desires at any given moment." Libertarians, in contrast, define freedom as "being able to do otherwise than what one actually does."

1. For Libertarianism to be true, the will must be able to make decisions contrary to prior inclinations. This is because in order for the will to be free in the libertarian sense, it must be arbitrary and turn in the face of preceding causes. For example, it must be possible for someone to be presented with two choices and have either choice be equally probable that either could be chosen. However, this is incoherent, because everyone always has a prior reason for the decisions that they make, whether it be disposition at the moment, instilled moral code, or simple preference at the time of decision. This leads in somewhat to my second argument.

2. For Libertarianism to be true, it must be possible for a volition to occur without a cause to its existence. The reason this is so is that if a volition has a prior cause, then the volition could never have been otherwise than what that prior cause had determined. In other words, in a Libertarian schema, Dave may at the given moment prefer chocolate and yet still decide to take the vanilla instead. But this makes no sense. It is literally a contradiction to say that at the given moment Dave's strongest desire was for chocolate, but his strongest desire was for vanilla. Some may say, "But that happens all the time. Sometimes people just want something different or want to 'mix it up.' " However, the question we must come back to is "Why?" Why did Dave pick the vanilla instead? It is because (though he had a prior preference of chocolate) his desire was strongest at that moment (for whatever reason) to try vanilla. This is classic Compatiblistic free will at work. Our decisions are always conditioned by something, and if our decisions are never free of prior causation, then Libertarian freedom is again, as I have charged, incoherent.

I should point out, again, that God's certain foreknowledge of future events (and human decisions in particular) renders Libertarian freedom impossible. The very existence of Open Theists, I would surmise, is evidence that one must deny God's exhaustive foreknowledge of future free human decisions in order to preserve and consistently protect this philosophical notion of Libertarian free will. I could use many other arguments, (examples include Edwards' argument that every effect has a necessary and sufficient cause of its existence) but this is a blog and not a book, so for now I will end with a quote from Edwards which, in my view, sums up the absurdity of the Libertarian position:

It is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the Will should come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a Cause. And if once we allow, that such a sort of effect as Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too?" (Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will Part II Sect. III)

9 comments:

  1. "For example, it must be possible for someone to be presented with two choices and have either choice be equally probable that either could be chosen."

    Probability has nothing to do with it. Libertarianism doesn't deal in probabilties, it deals in possibilities. Libertarianism does not say that a reasoned choice is not free, it says that a coerced choice is not free.

    "However, this is incoherent, because everyone always has a prior reason for the decisions that they make, whether it be disposition at the moment, instilled moral code, or simple preference at the time of decision."

    All of which are freely chosen. If they are not, they do not make a free choice.

    "For Libertarianism to be true, it must be possible for a volition to occur without a cause to its existence."

    Really, do you believe there is a logical problem with believing that something could be uncaused? Wow... I wonder who created God then. Who who created that creator, and that creator, and that...uh... infinite regress alert. Funny, you began by trying to show a logical fallacy in libertarianism... but ended up only showing a logical fallacy in your own approach to it.

    "The reason this is so is that if a volition has a prior cause, then the volition could never have been otherwise than what that prior cause had determined."

    True. Unfortunately for your argument, there is nothing logically incoherant about saying that something has no prior cause.

    "In other words, in a Libertarian schema, Dave may at the given moment prefer chocolate and yet still decide to take the vanilla instead. But this makes no sense. It is literally a contradiction to say that at the given moment Dave's strongest desire was for chocolate, but his strongest desire was for vanilla. Some may say, "But that happens all the time. Sometimes people just want something different or want to 'mix it up.' " However, the question we must come back to is "Why?" Why did Dave pick the vanilla instead? It is because (though he had a prior preference of chocolate) his desire was strongest at that moment (for whatever reason) to try vanilla. This is classic Compatiblistic free will at work. Our decisions are always conditioned by something, and if our decisions are never free of prior causation, then Libertarian freedom is again, as I have charged, incoherent."

    You're raising a new objection, you're raising the affirmative defense to compatibilism that people always do what they want, and you are asserting that "desire" is extrinsic to the will. But of course it's false that people always do what they most want to do. If a person holds a gun to your head and says pick vanilla, you choose against your preference for chocolate because you are forced to do so. I know that you going to say, but you are really choosing life because you desire life more than you desire chocolate (which might not be true for everybody!) however you fail to realize that a person can have more than two desires. A person can desire to live, AND chocolate... and by being coerced he chooses to live BUT HE STILL CHOOSES VANILLA WHICH HE DOESN'T DESIRE OVER CHOCOLATE WHICH HE DOES DESIRE. So that argument goes out the widow... plus if you start following that line of argument then the idea of coercion goes out that window if the coercion leaves any kind of non-meaningful choice. Under a compatiblistic model, one would be forced to say that holding a gun to someone's head and forcing him to choose between chocolate and vanilla STILL LEAVES A PERSON A FREE CHOICE. Which is absolutely absurd, because if you follow it to it's logical end... you have NO grounds whatsoever on which to argue that the person who holds the gun to the other person's head is responsbile for the other's actions.

    "I should point out, again, that God's certain foreknowledge of future events (and human decisions in particular) renders Libertarian freedom impossible. The very existence of Open Theists, I would surmise, is evidence that one must deny God's exhaustive foreknowledge of future free human decisions in order to preserve and consistently protect this philosophical notion of Libertarian free will.

    3 objections.
    1. The argument from God's foreknowledge to predestination is logically incoherant because it fails to recognize the distinction between the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent. That is, the arguement does not allow for a difference between saying that "Necessarily, if A then B" and "If A then necessarily B." Basic modal logic. If you reject it, you reject basic modal logic.

    2. The argument from God's foreknowledge to predestination is exactly that... AN ARGUMENT TO PREDESTINATION. It's not an argument for a compatiblist definition of freedom. (And as I've said before... it doesn't even argue to predestination soundly.)

    3. The fact that people hold to open theism doesn't reaveal the incoherancy of libertarian free will. It reveals that some people are irrational and decide not to recognize God's foreknowledge, because they make the same logical errors that compatalists make. (Note, I would call God's foreknowledge his a temporal knowledge.)

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  2. "All of which are freely chosen. If they are not, they do not make a free choice." Then only the first choice in the chain of choices was actually free, right? I hope you see the problem with this. Your argument cannot be that peoples’ first choices are free, but rather, you have to argue that all of our choices are free and not rendered necessary (even by prior circumstances).

    "Really, do you believe there is a logical problem with believing that something could be uncaused? Wow... I wonder who created God then."

    I'm seriously embarassed for you. Do we need to go back to where the little kid asks his dad who made God? I mean, if you wanted a retort to my suggestion, I knew this was where you'd have to go...I just didn't think you'd actually do it. God has no cause. He is the uncaused first cause. He's God, our will is not. Everything else in the universe has a cause. I am saying here that it is irrational to say that anything created by God can have any aspect which has no cause to it, since everything finds its grounding in the first uncaused cause. God in His nature is uncaused, but you need to show that our will is either God or is uncaused. I think this is a weird corner you're choosing to back into, here.

    Let me interject an argument: Your position implies that the particular decisions of the will are without a cause. In fact, you state this yourself. Therefore, your position is that volitions of the will are contingent events. Contingence is essential to your notion of freedom. But consider that any event which has a prior ground for its existence is caused by that antecedent event. And if that thing which has been caused by the antecedent event comes to pass, then that thing (as it turns out) is not contingent at all, because its existence is causally connected to a prior event, ad infinitum.

    "Unfortunately for your argument, there is nothing logically incoherant about saying that something has no prior cause." Sure there is. If something is not necessary in and of itself, then it must have a cause. Put another way, if something begins to be, then it has a Cause. God never began to be, and therefore, he has no cause. Again, I ask you to closely read this quote from Jonathan Edwards:

    “It is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the Will should come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a Cause. And if once we allow, that such a sort of effect as Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too?" (Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will Part II Sect. III)

    "BUT HE STILL CHOOSES VANILLA WHICH HE DOESN'T DESIRE OVER CHOCOLATE WHICH HE DOES DESIRE. So that argument goes out the widow." No, you're wrong. Just because your choices have been limited does not remove the fact that you must choose, and you will choose one of the two options. You either want to live and therefore pick something you don't prefer, or you decide to stand on principle and die over the ice cream you like best. Just because someone else has limited the options doesn't remove the fact that we must choose one or the other.

    "Under a compatiblistic model, one would be forced to say that holding a gun to someone's head and forcing him to choose between chocolate and vanilla STILL LEAVES A PERSON A FREE CHOICE." Yes, absolutely! Because that person still gets to choose between living while embracing something they don't believe in or dying on principle.

    "Which is absolutely absurd, because if you follow it to it's logical end... you have NO grounds whatsoever on which to argue that the person who holds the gun to the other person's head is responsbile for the other's actions."

    The person holding the gun is responsible for creating the situation and limiting the other person's choices to life or death, but there is no problem with that, so far as the compatiblistic model goes. They still aren't responsible for that person's ultimate choice. So no, it's not "absolutely absurd," because we don't need to argue that the one with the gun is responsible for the other's action. We need only understand that he is only responsible for creating this difficult situation where the choices have been whittled down to two.

    Obj. 1: "The argument from God's foreknowledge to predestination is logically incoherant because it fails to recognize the distinction between the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent." In the simplest language possible (this is because I know others who aren't getting their Masters' in philosophy who will read this): If God knows that I am going to eat a Poptart tomorrow morning, either He is wrong or He is right. If He is wrong about this, then He isn't the God of the Bible. If He is right about this, then it can never be otherwise than that I will eat the Poptart. If this is true, then it is certain that I will eat the Poptart tomorrow morning, and if it is certain that I will eat the Poptart, then this discussion is over, because libertarianism requires the possibility of the contrary, and this situation definitely doesn't allow for that.

    Now, I'm not arguing that God's foreknowledge causes our choices (which is necessary for your objection to make any sense), but I am arguing that it shows us that an event is necessary. Again, God's perfect and absolute foreknowledge of future free human choices does not make our choices necessary, but it is our evidence that such events are necessary.

    Obj. 2: "The argument from God's foreknowledge to predestination is exactly that... AN ARGUMENT TO PREDESTINATION. It's not an argument for a compatiblist definition of freedom." Maybe the real discussion we need to have, then, is whether or not you have a coherent model which allows for God's exhaustive foreknowledge of free human choices and the possibility of the contrary. You have yet to clearly present such a model. You have had the chance to critique the compatiblistic model. Perhaps we could get some clarity from your end, because what you've been suggesting seems nigh impossible, even without first assuming the truthfulness of compatiblism...

    Obj. 3: "The fact that people hold to open theism doesn't reaveal the incoherancy of libertarian free will. It reveals that some people are irrational and decide not to recognize God's foreknowledge." You're absolutely right. I won't rest any arguments on this point, though I still think it gives us something to consider: some people have found libertarianism and God's foreknowledge to be incompatible and found it easier to write off God's foreknowledge than to establish a philosophical model which allows for libertarian freedom and God's foreknowledge.

    Regarding your statement that God's foreknowledge is a temporal knowledge, I have not problem with this. I also believe that God is outside of time. I do, however, acknowledge that you see this knowledge as being more of a passive prescience. Is this correct?

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  3. "Then only the first choice in the chain of choices was actually free, right? I hope you see the problem with this. Your argument cannot be that peoples’ first choices are free, but rather, you have to argue that all of our choices are free and not rendered necessary (even by prior circumstances)."

    No, the first free choice does not necessarily dictate the latter choices. I don't even understand why you would assert that. Could you clarify? Just because a person chooses something in the past does not mean he dooms himself to base every other choice in the future off of that first choice, and the first choice does not logically neccesitate later choices. What I am saying is that even if a person decides that there is a good reason for his action this does not dictate the action. It's only a factor for consideration. The free choice is completely exclusive of dosposition, morality, preference, etc...

    Also, everyone does not always have a prior reason for the decisions that they make. Some are completely arbitrary.

    "I am saying here that it is irrational to say that anything created by God can have any aspect which has no cause to it, since everything finds its grounding in the first uncaused cause."

    This is a presupposition that I do not share with you. I'd prefer to believe that in God's omnipotence he could create a person IN HIS IMAGE. That is, a person with the same libertarian free will that he has. (Althogh I understand that it's entirely possible that you don't believe God has libertarian free will either I suppose, but to hold such a position would be to further diminish his perfection.)

    "God in His nature is uncaused, but you need to show that our will is either God or is uncaused. I think this is a weird corner you're choosing to back into, here."

    You said, "For Libertarianism to be true, it must be possible for a volition to occur without a cause to its existence."

    I merely pointed out an obvious flaw in the argument. Obviously some volition must occur without a cause or we are left with an infinite regress. Apparently you opt for the infinite regress. You opt for absurdity. Either that or inconsistency.

    "Everything else in the universe has a cause."

    This is a presupposition that we do not share. I see no reason accept the belief that two wills cannot coexist without one having caused the other.

    "Let me interject an argument: Your position implies that the particular decisions of the will are without a cause. In fact, you state this yourself. Therefore, your position is that volitions of the will are contingent events. Contingence is essential to your notion of freedom. But consider that any event which has a prior ground for its existence is caused by that antecedent event. And if that thing which has been caused by the antecedent event comes to pass, then that thing (as it turns out) is not contingent at all, because its existence is causally connected to a prior event, ad infinitum."

    This is false. The mere fact that A causes B's existence does not mean that A also causes actions that are freely chosen by B. You can only arrive at this conclusion by using mecahanistic determinism presuppositions, presuppositions which I reject and which are false. Rather start from libertarian presuppositions and you will realize that because of the fact that B has libertarian free will and was created by A, then the will is not controlled by A.

    ""Unfortunately for your argument, there is nothing logically incoherant about saying that something has no prior cause." Sure there is. If something is not necessary in and of itself, then it must have a cause. Put another way, if something begins to be, then it has a Cause. God never began to be, and therefore, he has no cause."

    You just contradicted yourself in the same paragraph, first you said "Sure it is" [true that it is logically incoherant to say that something has no prior cause]. Then you say "God never began to be and therefore, he has no cause." Direct violation of the law of noncontradiction... and appeal to God's necessity does not eliminate the contradiction. Either throw out the idea that God is uncaused, or throw out the idea that it is logically incoherant to believe that something can exist without a cause. And if you throw out the idea that it is logically incoherant to believe that something can exist without a cause, you lose your objection to my argument.

    “It is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the Will should come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a Cause."

    Definately not.


    "And if once we allow, that such a sort of effect as Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too?"

    How DO we know? We don't.

    "No, you're wrong. Just because your choices have been limited does not remove the fact that you must choose, and you will choose one of the two options. You either want to live and therefore pick something you don't prefer, or you decide to stand on principle and die over the ice cream you like best. Just because someone else has limited the options doesn't remove the fact that we must choose one or the other."

    AND
    "In other words, in a Libertarian schema, Dave may at the given moment prefer chocolate and yet still decide to take the vanilla instead. But this makes no sense."

    I'm pretty sure that I presented a scenario in which a person picked the item that he did not prefer over the item that he did prefer because he was coerced into doing so. So how can you say that it makes no sense to say that a person could ever choose an item for which he has less desire? What doesn't make sense is asserting that a person must necessarily always choose that which he desires most at any given moment, EVEN WHEN COERCED.

    ""Under a compatiblistic model, one would be forced to say that holding a gun to someone's head and forcing him to choose between chocolate and vanilla STILL LEAVES A PERSON A FREE CHOICE." Yes, absolutely! Because that person still gets to choose between living while embracing something they don't believe in or dying on principle."

    It's good to know that you are consistent on this point. It's also bad to know you're consistent with a false presupposition. I'd like to see you apply your compatiblistic presuppositions to the criminal justice system and see where we come out.

    "The person holding the gun is responsible for creating the situation and limiting the other person's choices to life or death, but there is no problem with that, so far as the compatiblistic model goes."

    Yet another reason to reject the compatibilistic model.

    "They still aren't responsible for that person's ultimate choice. So no, it's not "absolutely absurd," because we don't need to argue that the one with the gun is responsible for the other's action. We need only understand that he is only responsible for creating this difficult situation where the choices have been whittled down to two."

    Let me ask you this. Is there anything MORALLY wrong with creating such a difficult situationas aS has been previously described. If yes, then hasn't God created an analogously "difficult sitatuation" for humans to operate in under the compatibilistic model... if no, well if no then you are admitting that there's nothing wrong with holding a gun to someone's head and telling him to choose chocolate. Nothing inconsistent there prima facie (although I'm sure such a statement will reveal inconsistencies in your polticial philosophy, and maybe even theology)... but then again why be consistent if it means you can't hold people responsible for immoral coercion?

    "but I am arguing that it shows us that an event is necessary."

    And again, you are confusing the necessity of the consequent with the necessity of the consequence. Modal logic dictates that the statement "Necessarily if God foreknows that I will eat a pop-tart December 4th at 8'oclock, then I will eat a pop-tart December 4th at 8'oclock" is different from saying "If God foreknows that I will eat a pop-tart December 4th at 8'oclock, then necessarily I will eat a pop-tart December 4th at 8'oclock." The former is all that can be assumed from God's foreknowledge, the latter cannot be assumed from God's foreknowledge. The latter asserts that if God foreknows then it is inevitable that I will eat a pop-tart Dec 4th at 8. The former does not imply any inevitability. The former simply says it is logically true that if God foreknows then I will eat the pop-tart Dec 4th at 8. There is no room for implied inevitability in this form. The statment simply says that it is a logically true fact that if God foreknows something then I'll do it. Libertarian free will is still intact in the former scenario.
    But of course, you probably don't recognize the distinction as meaningful if you start from the presupposition of comaptibilistic freedom. (Another reason not to start from such a presupposition... it limits one from understanding the full extent of modal logic.)

    Obj 2 - I think I covered that in my last statement. Let me know if you need more clarity there.

    "I do, however, acknowledge that you see this knowledge as being more of a passive prescience. Is this correct?"

    No, that would make no sense to call it passive prescience, because that would imply temporality. I might have used passive prescience to describe a temporality in the past, but I realized it was counterproductive because of the fact that it implied temporality and didn't help to clarify anything. I think that I was probably confusing a temporality and necessity of the consequence/consequent but hadn't taken modal logic yet and had no way of conceptualizing what I was trying to say without resorting to passuse concepts that really make no sense like passive prescience. Plus there's really no way to conceptualize necessity of the consequnce/consequent to a person that doesn't begin from libertarian freedom as a presupposition I think, which I hadn't realized yet.

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  4. “No, the first free choice does not necessarily dictate the latter choices. I don't even understand why you would assert that.” Because every created thing has a necessary reason for its existence.

    “Also, everyone does not always have a prior reason for the decisions that they make. Some are completely arbitrary.” Such as… I'd like an example of something where I could not point to something else as the reason for the choice being made. I don't think such a scenario exists. Remember, I’m not saying that we always understand the reasons for our choices, only that we always have a reason.

    “This is a presupposition that I do not share with you. I'd prefer to believe that in God's omnipotence he could create a person IN HIS IMAGE. That is, a person with the same libertarian free will that he has.” This is your preference? That means little to me. I prefer a gum-drop God covered in sprinkles, but that doesn’t make it so. I do see your larger point, though, namely that you think God made a bunch of little sovereigns. How is it possible that God could choose to sovereignly limit his sovereignty? This does seem a bit difficult. In fact, I’m tempted to call it a contradiction.

    “(Although I understand that it's entirely possible that you don't believe God has libertarian free will either I suppose, but to hold such a position would be to further diminish his perfection.)” You read my mind. Boy, it’s like we took classes together or something! I’m troubled, however, that you think not having free will would diminish His perfection. Do you believe that God is able to sin? To me, the fact that God does not sin (and cannot sin) is one of the prime aspects of His perfection. For the record, I hope to someday be rendered unable to sin, as well. It is a deeply held dream of mine. That’s right. I want my free will cut down so I can be sinless, one day. Don’t you?

    “Obviously some volition must occur without a cause or we are left with an infinite regress.” Not true. My solution is that our volitions have a first cause. So no, I don’t opt for an infinite regress or absurdity.

    “I see no reason accept the belief that two wills cannot coexist without one having caused the other.” Do they both exist necessarily, in and of themselves? If so, then your universe is a dualistic universe. If dualism could be reasonably defended, then perhaps you would have something here. We both know you don’t really believe that, though.

    “The mere fact that A causes B's existence does not mean that A also causes actions that are freely chosen by B.” I’m not arguing that because God created us, He also created our actions. I’m putting forth something a bit more complex. Namely, in your universe, contingencies exist (in fact, they are essential). I am saying that if anything has an antecedent cause, then it is not contingent. I'm saying that contingencies do not exist because everything has a sufficient cause of its existence. Give me an example of something which you think is a good example of something which is not caused by an antecedent event; If this is as common as you say, then coming up with an example shouldn’t be too hard. You know… an example from everyday life.

    “You can only arrive at this conclusion by using mecahanistic determinism presuppositions, presuppositions which I reject and which are false.” I’m not saying you have to be a mechanistic determinist. I am simply saying that if someone believes that everything in the universe has a sufficient cause for its existence, then they will reject your worldview.

    “[B]ecause of the fact that B has libertarian free will and was created by A, then the will is not controlled by A.” I think that this again falls under my criticism of this idea that God can somehow sovereignly limit his sovereignty. Not only is this an absurd notion, but there is no example of God’s being unable to turn someone’s heart (whereas there a multitude of examples of the opposite). I recognize that this will come across as an argument from silence, which isn't entirely valid, but I do feel it is nonetheless a point which deserves considering.

    “You just contradicted yourself in the same paragraph, first you said ‘Sure it is’ [true that it is logically incoherant to say that something has no prior cause]. Then you say ‘God never began to be and therefore, he has no cause.’” Okay, that’s just irritating. I wrote that sentence with the understanding that you know I believe God is the exception to this. I know you think this is some sort of glorious checkmate, but all you did was focus on an imprecision in my statement. Let me clarify: I do believe that God has no prior cause. What I should have said is that it is logically incoherent to say that something which is not necessary in and of itself has no prior cause. There. You are still left to consider this question: does the human will exist necessarily in and of itself? No, it does not.

    “Definately not.” THAT is your response to Edwards? Okay, in that case, I’ll respond to all of your arguments in the same way. Oh, what’s that? You want me to offer reasons? Well, okay. Give me a break, Heretic. Edwards is arguing that if volitions may exist without causes, then what else might exist without causes? Matter, perhaps? Angels, devils, volcanoes? You should take what he says more seriously. You responded to this with: “How DO we know? We don't.” This response is troubling to me, and is a logical conclusion I hope most Christians will not follow you in holding. I will comment some more on this in my conclusion.

    “I'd like to see you apply your compatiblistic presuppositions to the criminal justice system and see where we come out.” Certainly. I already pointed out in part 2 of my blog series that we DO use compatiblistic presuppositions in punishing criminals, because we assume that their nature was the sufficient cause of their choices: something you must deny.

    “Let me ask you this. Is there anything MORALLY wrong with creating such a difficult situationas aS has been previously described.” You are mistaken in your application of this analogy. This analogy exists because you say that people CAN choose against their will. Not to illustrate God’s sovereignty over the will. God’s sovereignty over the will is not like when the bad man holds the gun to the donut-eater’s head. Therefore, you are simply going somewhere that the illustration is not intended to go. I’m sure you don’t see this, but just remember the roots of this illustration: it exists because you claim you have an example of a time when someone chooses against their will (something I charge never happens). Let’s keep the illustration to its intended point. I would never use this analogy to illustrate God’s sovereignty over the human will (I believe there are no human illustrations to parallel this doctrine). In fact, you will never hear me offer an illustration which parallels God's sovereignty over the human will.

    Regarding your discussion of my apparent mingling of the consequence from the consequent: even granting all your argument, you are still left with an outcome which is already certain. I don’t understand why this doesn’t trouble you. Consider an alternate approach to this: Any event which has happened in the past is certain and cannot be changed. We probably are both in agreement at this point. I believe you will also agree with me that God is outside of time and therefore perceives all events at once. For God, not only are all past events certain, but all future events are, as well, because he perceives them all at once. And if any event is certain, then there is no situation where the contrary is ever possible. This is still true, even if you don't like the implications of this. Again, you will say that I am confusing the necessity of the consequence with the necessity of the consequent, but I don’t see how this helps you. Again, I’m not arguing (as you seem to believe) that God’s knowledge of future free human choices causes those future free choices. I am only arguing that God’s knowledge is our evidence that they are certain. I’m trying to keep this as simple as I can.

    “No, that would make no sense to call it passive prescience, because that would imply temporality.” Actually, I understand this distinction you’re making. In normal language, when I speak of God in a temporal way, I am using anthropomorphic language which the common person can understand. So even the use of the word “prescience” is perfectly understandable from the human perspective. Of course, from the divine perspective there is no “future” or “past.” There is only “now.” So yes, I am in agreement with you on your understanding, here.

    Conclusion: I just want to be clear for those reading this, that if you hold to Heretic’s worldview, this is the universe you are left with: a universe where we do not know if events will happen without God’s permission, where original sin is not a reality (which easily places you outside the bounds of any traditional definition of Christianity), where events, ideas, and decisions can and do happen outside of even God’s sovereign will, and which is arrived at entirely (as far as we can tell) free of Scriptural study or exegesis. I don’t think this bodes well for your system at all as a viable, orthodox (all Calvinism aside), scripturally acceptable alternative to the compatiblistic system we have been setting forth here. What I have succeeded in doing here is not changing your mind (that was/is unlikely). But I have drawn your system away from the fold in that the implications and teachings of libertarian freedom, as set forth by you, should in fact, be purged from bible-believing evangelicalism today. Pointing this out to readers of this blog is really all I could ever hope to do. I recognize that to you, Heretic, this is nothing. But there are many of us for which the essentials are, well… essential. Recognition of God’s sovereignty as well as the doctrine of original sin are just some examples of this. Also, most Christians would feel that beliefs which are not primarily drawn from the Scriptures should be highly suspect. I think that your position very much fits this warrant of suspicion.

    [Boy oh boy, these responses keep getting longer. I'm trying to allay this by boiling things down to simpler points, but depending on how you decide to respond, this may not work. We'll see.]

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  5. "Such as… I'd like an example of something where I could not point to something else as the reason for the choice being made. I don't think such a scenario exists. Remember, I’m not saying that we always understand the reasons for our choices, only that we always have a reason."
    Well, I could give you an example but you will of course claim that there is some reason despite the absence. It's again, a presuppositional distinction between our views. But just for fun, let's say a person must choose between two items which are exactly identical to one another... under my view he could choose one. Under yours I guess he would be trapped in everlasting indecision because since there is no difference between the two, there is also no reason to choose one over the other.

    "This is your preference? That means little to me. I prefer a gum-drop God covered in sprinkles, but that doesn’t make it so. I do see your larger point, though, namely that you think God made a bunch of little sovereigns. How is it possible that God could choose to sovereignly limit his sovereignty? This does seem a bit difficult. In fact, I’m tempted to call it a contradiction."
    Ha ha ha. Sprinkles. Ah man that's funny. I'll try not to use the word preference any more if you don't like it. I was really just referring to the fact that picking presuppositions is arbitrary. God created little sovereigns? I would agree with that to a point. If what you meant by that is that God has freely created others with the ability to excercise the same freedom of will which he possessing and excercised in creating them, then yes. If you mean that God has created other perfect beings then no. Just depends on the definition. But yes, definately I would agree that man and God both possess libertarian free will and that there is no contradiction. The point is that God COULD control man but freely chooses not to. Also, just to anticipate and answer your other questions I actually DO believe that God could sin... if he couldn't then he would have no libertarian free will. He could sin, but chooses not to... and it is his choice not to that is a perfection... and in fact if he did not have the choice of whether to sin or not this would be an imperfection, and lack of sin would also not be itself a perfection because it is not freely chosen, and anything not freely chosen is not worthy of praise.

    "I want my free will cut down so I can be sinless, one day. Don’t you?"
    Definately not. Such a life would be utterly worthless, plus one can be sinless AND have libertarian free will so what benefit is there in having one's libertarian free will taken away? Having one's libertarian free will removed does not logically necessitate sinlessness... in fact even according to you you don't have libertarian free will now, and yet you admit that you are not sinless. So do you mean by this that you also want your compatibalistic free will cut down? What would that even mean? That you would be without desire? (Since according to you if you have a desire you have to follow it.)

    "Not true. My solution is that our volitions have a first cause. So no, I don’t opt for an infinite regress or absurdity."
    And what is the first cause of God's volition? Either he causes his own volition or it is caused by something external, and if it is caused by something external then something external transcends God and transcended him before the creation of the world. And if it is caused by God then he has libertarian free will.

    "Do they both exist necessarily, in and of themselves?"
    I'm not sure what you mean by this question. They both exist, but I'm not sure I'm ready to say that ANYTHING exists necessarily. (By necessarily I mean, I'm not sure that it must be the case that something has to exist.) I'm also not sure how you're defining dualism. If a logical implication of dualism is that two existential items could co exist without one having caused the other, then go ahead and call me a dualist... but I think that we should probably hash out exactly what your definition of a dualist is.

    "Give me an example of something which you think is a good example of something which is not caused by an antecedent event; If this is as common as you say, then coming up with an example shouldn’t be too hard. You know… an example from everyday life."
    I'm not sure this could be done without arguing presuppostionally. So an every day example would be, God created man with libertarian free will, then man of his own freely chosen volition chose to drive to work one day. Every day example and it's very common (I could go on naming examples for eternity), but also one which you will no doubt object to because it assumes what I am asserting. I have no problem with doing this however, because I'm not trying to prove my argument to you. I don't think I can present another example that is not a presuppositional example because I don't think this happens any other time; because man is incapable of creating something and instilling in that something libertarian free will. This is because we are not omnipotent. God on the other hand is capable of such action and the fact that we cannot do something does not imply that God cannot. Obviously we should not assume that our own characteristics are necessarily those of God.

    "I am simply saying that if someone believes that everything in the universe has a sufficient cause for its existence, then they will reject your worldview."
    No doubt they would.

    "Not only is this an absurd notion, but there is no example of God’s being unable to turn someone’s heart"
    I do not assert that God is UNABLE to turn someone's heart, I assert that he is ABLE to but chooses not to. (If by heart we mean predestine their actions... obviously I interpret those verses differently from you and don't believe that they indicate predestination.)

    "What I should have said is that it is logically incoherent to say that something which is not necessary in and of itself has no prior cause."
    Thank you, and no I wasn't trying to checkmate you cause I knew you didn't really mean what you were saying... I was just looking for the more precise statement. If we would have argued on the basis of the first wording we would have ended up in a weird place.

    "You are still left to consider this question: does the human will exist necessarily in and of itself? No, it does not."
    Once again, I'm not sure I'm comfortable with saying that anything necessarily exists in and of itself (because how could we measure that something is necessary without having a nonexistent standard with which to measure by?)however I would be willing to say (as I've said already) that the human will exists SEPERATE from God. (I don't see seperate and "necessary in and of itself" as the same concept.)

    "Edwards is arguing that if volitions may exist without causes, then what else might exist without causes? Matter, perhaps? Angels, devils, volcanoes? You should take what he says more seriously."
    The reason I said "definately not" is that his argument leads to an infinite regress which is an absurd conclusion, and impossible to say anything about other than that it is in fact absurd. If our wills could be uncaused, what else could be uncaused? Well... how about GOD for starters Edwards. Plus, I wanted to argue with you, not Edwards. And he's dead so he can't respond! Ha ha ha. I hope you find that as humurous as I do.

    "This response is troubling to me, and is a logical conclusion I hope most Christians will not follow you in holding."
    Right, but it's really a whole other seperate epistemological discussion that doesn't have a terrible amound of bearing on this one. But if you ask me an epistemoligical question, you'll always get that answer from me.

    "Certainly. I already pointed out in part 2 of my blog series that we DO use compatiblistic presuppositions in punishing criminals, because we assume that their nature was the sufficient cause of their choices: something you must deny."
    And of course, my problem with this is that you punish them for their action when their nature is cause of the action. If one's nature is the cause of one's action why punish for the action? Why not punish for the nature? Or why punish at all? But really what I was getting at was more specific... I was specfically talking about the doctrine of self defense. You said, "Yes, absolutely[that the person has free will]! Because that person still gets to choose between living while embracing something they don't believe in or dying on principle." If you assert this then you must agree that a person who has a gun held to his head ought to be responsible for any "choice" that he makes while under such compulsion. So for instance... if a man gets into your car, puts a gun to your head, and tells you to drive as fast as you can down the highway... when the cop pulls you over for speeding not only should he arrest the man for putting a gun to your head BUT HE SHOULD STILL ISSUE YOU A SPEEDING TICKET! After all, you freely chose to speed, according to your model.

    "You are mistaken in your application of this analogy. This analogy exists because you say that people CAN choose against their will. Not to illustrate God’s sovereignty over the will. God’s sovereignty over the will is not like when the bad man holds the gun to the donut-eater’s head. Therefore, you are simply going somewhere that the illustration is not intended to go. I’m sure you don’t see this, but just remember the roots of this illustration: it exists because you claim you have an example of a time when someone chooses against their will (something I charge never happens). Let’s keep the illustration to its intended point. I would never use this analogy to illustrate God’s sovereignty over the human will (I believe there are no human illustrations to parallel this doctrine). In fact, you will never hear me offer an illustration which parallels God's sovereignty over the human will."

    Well my application is not mistaken, but it does assume my presuppositions, so again there's no way either of us can consistently agree on the other's application of the analogy. However, as I said in my last example (the speeding example) I think your interpretation has some application problems that you might want to think through. I'm not saying you're internally inconsistent because I don't know all of your views on how to apply compatabalistic freedom to the law.

    "And if any event is certain, then there is no situation where the contrary is ever possible"
    This is the mistaken presupposition to which I was referring in my discussion of modal logic.

    "Again, you will say that I am confusing the necessity of the consequence with the necessity of the consequent, but I don’t see how this helps you."
    It helps my argument, because it knocks down your proof from God's foreknowledge. It also knocks down proofs that try to argue from God's knowledge of the past. It knocks down any proof that asserts that just because something is necessarily so, then it must be so of necessity... because THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO CONCEPTS SUCH THAT NEITHER IMPLIES THE OTHER.

    "Again, I’m not arguing (as you seem to believe) that God’s knowledge of future free human choices causes those future free choices. I am only arguing that God’s knowledge is our evidence that they are certain. I’m trying to keep this as simple as I can."
    No I don't think you are arguing that God's knowledge CAUSES the events, but rather that you are arguing that the fact that God knows such event shows that they are necessarily so... but I assert that being necessarily so and being so of necessity are two different modal conclusions with two different logical consequences which you confuse.

    "Actually, I understand this distinction you’re making. In normal language, when I speak of God in a temporal way, I am using anthropomorphic language which the common person can understand. So even the use of the word “prescience” is perfectly understandable from the human perspective. Of course, from the divine perspective there is no “future” or “past.” There is only “now.” So yes, I am in agreement with you on your understanding, here."
    Alert the presses! We agree on something!

    "...and which is arrived at entirely (as far as we can tell) free of Scriptural study or exegesis"
    I thought this was s forum on the "incoherence of libertarian freedom" not the lack of scriptural support for libertarian freedom. When did scripture even come up in this discussion, other than to say we probably approach scripture differently. Also, I never claimed to be "orthodox." (If I did I probably wouldn't have used the name "heretic" since I basically define the term as unorthodox.)

    "What I have succeeded in doing here is not changing your mind (that was/is unlikely). But I have drawn your system away from the fold in that the implications and teachings of libertarian freedom, as set forth by you, should in fact, be purged from bible-believing evangelicalism today. Pointing this out to readers of this blog is really all I could ever hope to do. I recognize that to you, Heretic, this is nothing. But there are many of us for which the essentials are, well… essential. Recognition of God’s sovereignty as well as the doctrine of original sin are just some examples of this. Also, most Christians would feel that beliefs which are not primarily drawn from the Scriptures should be highly suspect. I think that your position very much fits this warrant of suspicion."
    I agree with you... most Christians disagree with me. And I also don't want anyone asserting libertarian freedom if they don't really believe it. I'd rather someone be wrong than inconsistent. So if you woo inconsitent Arminians over to the Calvanist perspective more power to ya. They'll be wrong, but at least they won't make the libertarian free will perspective look logically incoherant. The whole point in my participation in this discussion is to show that you cannot demonstrate libertarian free will to be logically incoherant and I think that I've shown that thus far by refuting any logical argument you have against it. (Although maybe the discussion is not over yet?) This is not to say that your position is logically incoherant. I don't believe it is and I've never heard you assert and hold to anything that seems logically incoherant... although perhaps (as I mentioned earlier) there may or may not be application problems. My point is never to prove my point. We both know that we can't prove our point to someone who disagrees with our presuppositions. But hopefully, if someone is reading this they'll realize that there is nothing logically incoherant about rejecting the compatablistic model of freedom, and perhaps if they share similar presuppositions they can use my model to fill in the presuppositions that they have not yet though through. Good talk though. Not that I'm cutting you off. We can always keep this going. I'm pretty sure I've raised new objections in this post.

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  6. I'm going to decide not to pursue the individual arguments you've made on this post, if nothing else, for a sense of closure. I think you've offered challenging things for us to consider.

    A few thoughts I'd like to leave hanging here:

    1. The issue of presuppositions has come up so often that I believe we both need to consider where we get our presuppositions from. I make no qualms that I do my best to base my presuppositional belief in the truthfulness of compatiblistic freedom on the Bible. I believe it is explicitly taught, I believe there are voluminous examples of its taking place, and as such, I have a philosophical commitment to its truthfulness.

    I do believe that my presupposition is derived from Scripture, and at this point I am under the impression that your presuppositional leaning to libertarian freedom is, in contrast, derived from a philosophical commitment which you believe can be squared with a reading of scripture.

    2. These two different approaches can be summarized thus: I get my philosophical view of compatiblistic free will from The Bible, whereas you find your philosophical view of libertarian free will in the Bible.

    If this summary is unfair or incorrect, perhaps we should spend some time in the first post I did on the subject of libertarianism (the one where I used a bunch of Biblical examples of people being sovereignly decreed to sin and then being judged for those sins).

    3. Reading your conclusion, as well, causes me to think that we really do see this issue the very same way: if one wants to be orthodox, in the traditional and evangelical sense, in order to be consistent, one should hold to compatiblistic freedom.

    4. My closing thought to you would be to implore you to ascribe a higher value to the teaching of Scripture and less value to philosophical precommitments. Your philosophical precommitments can be (and I'm pretty sure, are) in error. [I hope you'll take this next piece of advice for what it is, and not as an overall epistimological system.] You and your ideas about God can be wrong. But The Bible cannot be. You cannot be steered wrong by holding fast to the Bible.

    5. I am pretty sure you don't agree with this, but again, I hope our readers will see the stark contrast between your opinions about God, freedom, and the universe and The Bible's teaching about these same things. I hope our readers do see a difference, and I hope they choose The Bible over The Heretic's ideas. One is fallible, and one is not. This again underlines the importance of deriving our doctrine (and philosophy) from Scripture.

    Now, you may not agree with the interpretations that Josh and I set forth. That's okay, so long as we are willing to stick to the text and actively and faithfully pursue the meaning of the text we cannot go wrong, because we can always be corrected by the "sure thing." This is why exegetical work should be done when someone has a doctrinal difference or a disagreement on the meaning of the text. We shouldn't point to those differences as an excuse for abandoning the "biblical project" altogether. And we shouldn't use our philosophical precommitments as an excuse to not examine the text of Scripture.

    By the way, thanks for the generous words in your last paragraph. As Patrick from Spongebob once said, "It would seem... we have reached an impasse."

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  7. "These two different approaches can be summarized thus: I get my philosophical view of compatiblistic free will from The Bible, whereas you find your philosophical view of libertarian free will in the Bible."

    I think this is a fair characterization of my view but not a fair characterization of yours. I find my presuppositions in scripture, just as you pretend to. Neither of us start with scripture... you had to have held presuppositions before ever coming into contact with scripture... and sure you could have changed all of your presuppositions around after discovering scripture (however unlikely this seems), but this does not imply that the presuppositions were logically caused by the scripture... but rather only that your new presuppositions line up with your intepretation of scripture. There is nothing that logically necessitates that compatibalists have to start with scripture and libertarians have to start with philosophy. A libertarian could start with scripture to arrive at his presuppositions, just as a compatibalist could find his presuppositions in scripture.

    "My closing thought to you would be to implore you to ascribe a higher value to the teaching of Scripture and less value to philosophical precommitments. Your philosophical precommitments can be (and I'm pretty sure, are) in error. [I hope you'll take this next piece of advice for what it is, and not as an overall epistimological system.] You and your ideas about God can be wrong. But The Bible cannot be. You cannot be steered wrong by holding fast to the Bible."

    It makes no more sense to say that you ascribe a higher value to scripture than you do to philsoophy, than it does to say you ascribe a higher value to philosophy than scripture. In either case if both are true you ascribe equal ontological value to both. Yes my ideas could possibly wrong, but then again so could the Bible. If my ideas were incorrect, then the Bible would also be incorrect, just as if the Bible were incorrect then my views would also be incorrect. It's an if and only if situation. I think it's rather unfair to present the situation as if I care more about my philosophy than I do scripture, just because I like to participate in philosophical discussions more than theological discussions. The fact that I choose to major in philosophy does not mean that theology does not matter to me. It just means that I don't choose to focus my attention primarily on that area. Just as the fact that I now choose to focus on the law does not mean I am abandoning philosophy and theology as irrelevant. They are all important to me... but I'm not going to pretend like I can get into an exigetical discussion on the true meaning of the Greek in certain theological passages. I don't get into heavy philisophical discussions with my law classmates... I get into legal discussions, because that's what they know, and I don't act as if you don't care about the law or government just because you don't focus your studies on either of them.

    "We shouldn't point to those differences as an excuse for abandoning the "biblical project" altogether. And we shouldn't use our philosophical precommitments as an excuse to not examine the text of Scripture."

    Again, if this is directed at me, I think it's an unfair point. I don't use the fact that I like to emphasize philosophy as an excuse not to examine scripture, and I certainly don't believe in abandoning scripture. I only believe in abandoning your faulty compatibilist interpretation of scripture. And I do examine scripture... but not in depth enough to have a meaningful exegetical discussion with you... which is why I stay out of those kind of discussions, just as I wouldn't expect you to be able to have a meaningful discussion with me on Federal civil procedure. We all need to focus on something. I'd love to be an expert in everything, but I'm only human. As far as everything else you said in the last post though, I agree. I enjoyed this.

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  8. "I think this is a fair characterization of my view but not a fair characterization of yours. I find my presuppositions in scripture, just as you pretend to. Neither of us start with scripture... you had to have held presuppositions before ever coming into contact with scripture." Let me put it this way (and this is Josh Walker's position, as well): if the Bible did not teach compatiblistic freedom, I would not believe it. I would either be a full-on determinist (i.e. Gordon H. Clark) or a full-on Libertarian (i.e. You or Pinnock or Boyd). So I disagree with your assessment of my position. I do not believe you would agree with the following statement: "If the Bible did not teach Libertarian freedom, I would not believe it." I'm pretty sure this could not be said of you. I'm pretty sure you don't say this.

    "I don't use the fact that I like to emphasize philosophy as an excuse not to examine scripture, and I certainly don't believe in abandoning scripture."

    I want to be clear that I don't think you do this. I am referring to specific times when we have had theological discussions and you have made clear that your philosophical explorations are what drive your theological beliefs. I wish I could find a quote, but we've done so much discussion I can't imagine where to start looking.

    Now, you know I am not opposed to philosophy. After all, I have my Bachelor's in philosophy! I believe philosophy exists to keep us thinking clearly about God. It is, as some have termed it, "theology's handmaiden." It is there to help us, to offer clarity, but never to trump or inform our reading of Scripture.

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  9. "Let me put it this way (and this is Josh Walker's position, as well): if the Bible did not teach compatiblistic freedom, I would not believe it. I would either be a full-on determinist (i.e. Gordon H. Clark) or a full-on Libertarian (i.e. You or Pinnock or Boyd). So I disagree with your assessment of my position. I do not believe you would agree with the following statement: "If the Bible did not teach Libertarian freedom, I would not believe it." I'm pretty sure this could not be said of you. I'm pretty sure you don't say this."

    Actually I think I probably would say that if the Bible didn't teach libertarian freedom I wouldn't believe it, because then it would be wrong. Also it doesn't seem like you could say you wouldn't believe it if it taught libertarian free will, and also say that you derive your views on free will FROM the Bible. If that were the case it would seem you would simply have to become a libertarian.

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