Response to Critics of the TAG
With this brief outline of the transcendental TAG, we can turn to the main objective of this paper, which is a response to critics of this argument. In this section a response will be given to two main critics of the TAG: (1) Michael Martin, atheist professor Emeritus of Philosophy at
a. A Brief Response to “Does Induction Presume the Existence of the Christian God?”[1]
Martin begins his discussion of the transcendental argument by giving an overview of the TAG. His overview is not one of the strongest overviews on the subject, but he does hit the essence of the presuppositional argument.
The basic idea of TAG when used against atheists is easy to understand and state. It maintains that certain things that atheists assume are true can only be true if there is a God. Primarily these atheistic assumptions are the beliefs that logical reasoning is possible, that scientific inference is justified, and that objective moral standards exist. So if an atheist uses logic to refute a theistic argument, uses scientific evidence to undermine some biblical position, or argues that God’s omnipotence and moral perfection are incompatible with evil in the world and consequently that God does not exist, TAG maintains that he or she is implicitly assuming God’s existence.[2]
After Martin’s overview of the TAG, he moves to a response to this argument. His main point is that even if the transcendental argument is sound it fails to show that the Christian God exists. He states the argument in this form, “To say that A presupposes B is to say that we could not ‘make sense’ of A without assuming B. However, supposing we grant that one must assume B to make sense of A, it does not follow that B is true.”[3] Martin is right here, however, this is not the claim made by the TAG. The TAG adds that everyone accepts “B” to be the case. This is why the TAG is so forceful. But Martin misses this point and it is seen in his counter example: “For example, if I am trying to communicate to an audience by speaking to them in English, my action makes no sense unless they understand English. But it does not follow that they do. They might only understand Chinese.”[4] Martin’s example illustrates that he has missed the weight of the transcendental argument. First, in the example given by Martin, the person speaking in English, in order to communicate (which is a speakers primary goal), must assume that the hearers know English. To apply this to the realm of the transcendental argument, if a person uses induction then that person must assume the Christian God. Martin fails to see that the very example he uses helps support the presuppositional argument. For if the communicator did not believe that his audience spoke English, he would not be speaking it. Granted, this does not mean that the audience does speak English (or God exists), but it does mean that the speaker believes this to be the case. To apply this to our situation, the non-Christian, must think that the Christian God is real in order to uses, say, induction.
Second, the claim made by the transcendental argument is not only that the non-Christian believes in the Christian God (which the transcendental argument does claim), but that the Christian God must be true in order for induction, or any other fact, to be true. Martin’s counter example fails to address the full claim of the transcendental argument. In other words, his counter example does not do justice to what the TAG is trying to address. Martin has set up a rather easy straw man to knock down. If Martin wanted to uses a better analogy (or illustration) for the TAG, the following would work better. The speaker in standing on a stage in front of an audience and the whole point of his speech is way he is not standing on a stage. The speaker is standing on the very thing he is attempting to deny.
Again, Martin fails, as he does many times in this article, to see the weightiness of the transcendental argument. In addition to this, Martin says, “[The transcendental argument] would not establish the truth of the Christian worldview but only the inconsistency of atheists [non-Christians] who presuppose science, logic and objective ethics.”[5] This statement by Martin fails to understand that the strongest logical argument that can be made in favor of a proposition is reductio ad absurdum. That is to say, that demonstrative proof for p can be made by assuming ~p and showing that a contradiction follows, thus proving the truth of p. But Martin assumes that this form of argument, reductio ad absurdum, does not prove anything; rather only shows the falseness of atheism. Martin is wrong in this assumption, and thus by admitting that if the transcendental argument is true the atheist would be inconsistent, he shows that this is a positive proof for the Christian worldview.
b. A Brief Response to “The Transcendental Argument for the Non Existence of God”[6]
Martin endeavors to show that the truth of logic, science and morality presuppose the falsehood of Christianity. “I will show how one can argue exactly the opposite conclusion [of the TAG], namely, that logic, science and morality presuppose the falsehood of the Christian world view or at least the falsehood of the interpretation of his world view.”[7] Martin’s best transcendental argument for the nonexistence of God is based on the law of logic.
Consider logic. Logic presupposes that its principles are necessarily true. However, according to the brand of Christianity assumed by TAG, God created everything, including logic; or at least everything, including logic, is dependent on God. But if something is created by or is dependent on God, it is not necessary—it is contingent on God. And if principles of logic are contingent on God, they are not logically necessary. Moreover, if the principles of logic are contingent on God, God could change them. Thus, God could make the law of noncontradiction false; in other words, God could arrange matters so that a proposition and its negation were true at the same time. But this is absurd.
There is no disagreement that the principles of logic are necessary, in fact, the necessity of logic is one of the arguments for God. But they are necessary for humans, not God. This is a fundamental problem in Martin’s worldview. He seems to think that God is a creature, as he is, and as such that God is bound (if he exists) to logic. This is the exact opposite of what is claimed by the Christian worldview. God is the creator and we are his creature. This is a fundamental metaphysical distinction in the Christian concept of reality. The “Eimi/eikon” distinction is central to the way the universe is ordered.
We must, then, begin with this basic and fundamental distinction—the Eimi/eikon distinction—the distention of the “I am” and his image. If we begin in that way, then all of our discussion about “reality,” “individuality,” “externality,” “objectivity,” “knowledge,” “truth,” and the like has that distinction as its context and as its defining character.[8]
Martin fails to understand this central principle of the Christian faith. His unbelieving worldview leads him in this direction, and on one level he cannot be faulted for the conclusions he comes to. However, on another level, he misses this critical distinction and as such misses the whole point of the TAG and can be faulted for misunderstanding the argument he is trying to engage. Though his argument is original, it fails to do any substantial damage to the presupposition argument because he fails to see the “Eimi/eikon” distinction, which leads him to wrongly conclude that God would be held in subjection to logic.
c. A Brief Response to “The Transcendental Argument”[9]
Unlike Martin, Choi does a much better job of setting forth the TAG. However, his criticisms still fall short. Choi’s criticism of the TAG demonstrates that he understands the ‘heart’ of the TAG when he argues that: “It is possible that: there is a worldview distinct from Christian theism and which is such that if it were true, it would provide a sufficient justification for the laws of logic.”[10] In arguing this way, Choi basically grants the validity of the TAG,[11] but he argues that the primes that states the Christian God is the only way to account for intelligibility is false. Choi does this by attempting to provide another worldview that would satisfy the preconditions for intelligibility.
As a specific illustration of such a worldview, consider Fristianity, which is a theistic worldview that holds to the doctrine of the quadrinity (one God in four persons) and is otherwise identical to Christianity, or as similar to Christianity as possible (given its qaudrinitarian tenet).[12]
Thus, Choi offer “Fristianity” as an alternative worldview to Christianity that, as he claims, would account for the preconditions for intelligibility. This argument is not substantial to the TAG for at least two reasons. First, we are not concerned about hypothetical worldviews that can be made up to fit the preconditions; rather, we are interested in actual worldviews. In other words, the TAG is concerned with actual worldviews that can stand this criticism. If no one holds to “Fristianity”, at the end of the day, it is really irrelevant to the presuppositional project.
Second, and much more substantial, Choi has failed to provided a coherent worldview to account for intelligibility. The worldview that Choi sets forth is identical to Christianity with one major alteration, the Trinity is gone. But what Choi does not understand that worldviews are not disconnected propositions—as if one doctrine can be changed and the system remains largely in tack. Instead, worldviews are organic. One part flows into the other. By changing one part the whole system will change. Thus, if the doctrine of the Trinity is changed the entire worldview is altered. Take for instance the doctrine of the Scripture. The Christian worldview teaches that the Bible is the final and complete revelation from God about himself. If the Trinity were altered, the Christian Bible would have to be altered significantly to make room for the “quadrinity.” At the very least, sections would have to be added introducing us to this fourth person. Or take the doctrine of salvation; it would have to be changed. As it stands, Christianity holds that all three person of the Trinity are directly involved in the salvation of God’s people—the Father chooses his people, the Son dies for his people and the Holy Spirit sanctifies his people. If a fourth person were added to the Godhead, a role for this person would need to be added to the doctrine of salvation. These are but a few of the many examples that could be given to show that adding the “quadrinity” is not as nice and neat as Choi would like it to be and as such, Choi fails to understand the organic nature of worldviews.
[1] Martin, Michael. “Does Induction Presume the Existence of the Christian God?” Skeptic Vol. 5, #2: 71-75.
[2] Ibid., 72.
[3] Ibid., 72.
[4] Ibid., 73.
[5] Ibid., 73.
[6] Martin, Michael. “The Transcendental Argument for the Nonexistence of God.” 1996. [April 30, 2008.].
[7] Ibid., pp. 1
[8] Scott Oliphint, Reasons for Faith: Philosophy in the service of Theology (
[9]Choi. “The Transcendental Argument.”
[10] Choi. “The Transcendental Argument.” 243.
[11] In fact, from page 236 to 242 Choi goes to length to show a valid form of the TAG.
[12] Choi. “The Transcendental Argument.” 243 (emphasis mine)
1) I agree with Martin when he says:
ReplyDelete“[The transcendental argument] would not establish the truth of the Christian worldview but only the inconsistency of atheists [non-Christians] who presuppose science, logic and objective ethics.”
I think the argument might work if you first proved that the correct worldview had to be either Christianity or Atheism (or pick whatever). Then if you proved the invalidity of Atheism, Christianity would necessarily be true. However, it may be the case that both are incorrect. Therefore proving one wrong does not necessarily prove the other right.
In my poking around with studying logic, I think this is referred to as the difference between the contradictory and the contrary.
2) I disagree with you in regards to logic as created and God not being bound by it. I believe logic is how God thinks. If God created logic, He could have created it differently so that, as Martin said, the law of noncontradiction is false. Attempting to say that God is beyond logic destroys the Christian faith, it does not defend it.
3) Fristianity is not irrelevant. His point, I assume, was simply to show what I mentioned in 1), that proving atheism and all other known worldviews false does not prove Christianity true. Human beings may not know the correct understanding of the universe, so all known worldviews may be false, including Christianity. You are assuming that human beings (at least one) know the nature of this world. We may not. The truth may not be a currently known worldview. That may be improbable, but it is not impossible.
Brandon,
ReplyDeleteIn response to your first point:
The reason you agree with Martin is because you and Martin fail to see the claim the TAG is making. Set aside for a moment if the TAG proves the existence of God. If it does or not does not matter at this particular point. The TAG is claiming that the only way that science, logic and objective ethics can be true is if God exists and the atheist (in the case Martin) believes these thing to be true. Further, the TAG claims that the only way to even begin thinking is if the God of the Bible is true. Now, the question of is this right or not is a different question. Your first point is that the TAG cannot prove the existence of God but only that an atheist is inconsistent. This is to miss the weight and the claim of the TAG.
As to your second point:
This is the classic Clarkian position. The only response I have for now is, how can you make the claim God is bound by logic and hold to: 1) the sovereignty of God and 2) the classic Reformed distinction between the Creator and the Creator.
As to your third point:
Again, you have missed the claim of the TAG. The TAG is claiming that the only way to make sense of anything is for the Christian worldview to be true. This claim could be wrong, but if right, it can and does prove the christian worldview.
Josh,
ReplyDeleteAre you aware of the difference between the contrary and the contradictory?
I do not see how your first paragraph shows that I fail to understand TAG.
Can you point to any theologian in the history of the Reformed tradition, other than Van Til, that says the Creator/creature distinction means that logic is created and applies only to man?
I fail to see the inconsistency of believing that God is sovereign and that He thinks logically. Logic is not something outside of God that He is bound to, it is part of His nature, it is how He thinks.
Have you read Robert Reymond's defense of Clark on this point in his Systematic?
Third, the way that TAG attempts to prove the claim that Christianity is the only way to make sense of anything is by showing how other worldviews fail in this regard. Showing the failure of every other known worldview does not sufficiently prove that Christianity is true. I understand the claim. I disagree with it. My, and Martin's, argument, at this point, rests on the difference between the contrary and the contradictory.
Brandon,
ReplyDeleteYou asked, “Are you aware of the difference between the contrary and the contradictory?”
Yes.
You said, “I do not see how your first paragraph shows that I fail to understand TAG.”
Here is how you miss the TAG, “the way that TAG attempts to prove the claim that Christianity is the only way to make sense of anything is by showing how other worldviews fail in this regard.”
This is only part of what the TAG does. You are right to say that as a presupposition apologist; much time is spent deconstructing other worldviews. However, this is not the only way the TAG works. The TAG also argues that for any fact to be a fact the Christian God must exist and, in fact, be God. It is the second part of the argument that you (and many others, including Martin) fail to grasp. This is how the TAG could prove the Christian worldview even if it was the only worldview.
You asked, “Can you point to any theologian in the history of the Reformed tradition, other than Van Til, that says the Creator/creature distinction means that logic is created and applies only to man?”
Scott Oliphint
You said, “I fail to see the inconsistency of believing that God is sovereign and that He thinks logically. Logic is not something outside of God that He is bound to, it is part of His nature, it is how He thinks.”
The way, as I see it, that God is bound is by our understanding of logic. Nowhere in the Bible does it indicate that God is bound to our understanding of logic. I crude analogy would be: try to imagine how a square could explain to a circle what a cube is like. The square could accurately describe the cube, but it could never get at it in its fullness. Why? Because the square it two dimensional and the cube is three dimensional. The square lacks a huge aspect, namely depth, that is needed to describe the cube. The same is true about us. We lack a huge aspect of God, namely infinity (two name only one). Thus to put our understanding of logic onto God is to robe him of his sovereignty. We are telling God that he must line up with our conception of logic. The only way to say other wise would be to show from God’s revelation that he understands and his mind works by our conception of logic.
You asked, “Have you read Robert Reymond's defense of Clark on this point in his Systematic?”
Yes.
Thanks for trying to clarify.
ReplyDelete[[The TAG also argues that for any fact to be a fact the Christian God must exist and, in fact, be God. It is the second part of the argument that you (and many others, including Martin) fail to grasp. This is how the TAG could prove the Christian worldview even if it was the only worldview.]]
How does it do this? Does it not do this by showing the absurdity of the contrary?
--
Let me clarify: Can you point to any Reformed theologian prior to Van Til?
You are assuming that we are placing "our understanding of logic" onto God. Is it impossible for God to reveal His logic to us? Just because God is infinite and knows everything does not mean that we don't know some of the same things that God does. That's the whole point of revelation.
If you have read Reymond's critique, and you still hold to Van Til's analogical thought, then I have nothing left I can say.
"“To say that A presupposes B is to say that we could not ‘make sense’ of A without assuming B. However, supposing we grant that one must assume B to make sense of A, it does not follow that B is true.” Martin is right here, however, this is not the claim made by the TAG. "
ReplyDeleteYou've stated that Martin is correct, but Martin's point is that the TAG claims that B's truth logically follows from the argument. In fact it does not necessarily logically follow, which you've admitted. If B's truth does not necessarily follow from the argument then "God's existence" = B's truth also does not necessarily follow from the argument.
"The TAG adds that everyone accepts “B” to be the case. This is why the TAG is so forceful."
There is certainly nothing which everyone accepts to be the case.
"First, in the example given by Martin, the person speaking in English, in order to communicate (which is a speakers primary goal), must assume that the hearers know English. "
This is false. Just because the speaker is speaking in english does not mean he must assume that the hearers understand him. It could be the case for instance, that he's being paid to give a speech... that the person paying him does not realize he does not speak chinese, and that when the speaker gets to the room full of chinese persons he walks in and sees that they are all chinese and assumes that they probably speak only chinese. Yet because he has contracted to give the speech he gives it in English, the only language he can give it in... even though he believes that no one in the audience understands him (a belief which is perhaps confirmed by the looks of confusion on the faces of the members of the audience as he continues to give the speech all the way up until the last word.)
"Granted, this does not mean that the audience does speak English (or God exists), but it does mean that the speaker believes this to be the case."
So you admit that the transcendental argument does not necessarily prove the existence of God?
"Martin’s counter example fails to address the full claim of the transcendental argument. In other words, his counter example does not do justice to what the TAG is trying to address. Martin has set up a rather easy straw man to knock down."
How so? You've failed to point out where the argument falls short... in fact you've even admitted the whole point of his argument which is that the members of the audience don't necessarily speak english. (I.E. God does not necessarily exist.)
"The speaker in standing on a stage in front of an audience and the whole point of his speech is way he is not standing on a stage. The speaker is standing on the very thing he is attempting to deny."
Could you hash this out a bit. You haven't really given a comprehensible analogy.
“[The transcendental argument] would not establish the truth of the Christian worldview but only the inconsistency of atheists [non-Christians] who presuppose science, logic and objective ethics.” This statement by Martin fails to understand that the strongest logical argument that can be made in favor of a proposition is reductio ad absurdum. That is to say, that demonstrative proof for p can be made by assuming ~p and showing that a contradiction follows, thus proving the truth of p. But Martin assumes that this form of argument, reductio ad absurdum, does not prove anything; rather only shows the falseness of atheism."
You've mischaracterized what Martin is saying here. He is not saying that the TAG would "only show the falseness of atheism." This wouldn't make any sense for him to say since he is arguing that the TAG does not prove God's existence. If atheism is false then God exists and if the TAG disproved atheism it would thereby prove God's existence. What Martin is saying is that even if the TAG were true it WOULD NOT DISPROVE ATHEISM, but would merely show that atheism is inconsistent with the presuppositions that supposedly necessitate the existence of God. Therefore atheists would need to abondon those propositions. This is correct. If the TAG is true it does not mean that God exists, but only that God exists if each of the propositions that necessitate his existence are also true. The atheist who holds to those propositions would be inconsistent, but there is nothing which logically necessitates that an atheist must hold to those positions, therefore atheism itself is not disproved by the mere fact that certain propositions held by inconsistent atheists necessitate a God. Atheism could abandon those positions and still be atheism.
"Consider logic. Logic presupposes that its principles are necessarily true. However, according to the brand of Christianity assumed by TAG, God created everything, including logic; or at least everything, including logic, is dependent on God. But if something is created by or is dependent on God, it is not necessary—it is contingent on God. And if principles of logic are contingent on God, they are not logically necessary. Moreover, if the principles of logic are contingent on God, God could change them. Thus, God could make the law of noncontradiction false; in other words, God could arrange matters so that a proposition and its negation were true at the same time. But this is absurd."
Martin's argument here fails because he assumes that God created logic. In fact God is subject to logic. He did not create it. Your critique of his argument however ignores this fact. In fact you seem to assume the same faulty presupposition as he does. Instead you opt for the cop-out argument... the WELL GOD IS GOD AND WE ARE NOT ARGUMENT. In other words you have no way to refute his argument without admiting that God is subject to certain principles so instead you just agree with him that God is not subject to those princples, and justify it by saying BUT IT'S OK CAUSE HE'S GOD. But this does nothing to refute his argument. It just ignores that absurdity of your position.
"First, we are not concerned about hypothetical worldviews that can be made up to fit the preconditions; rather, we are interested in actual worldviews. In other words, the TAG is concerned with actual worldviews that can stand this criticism. If no one holds to “Fristianity”, at the end of the day, it is really irrelevant to the presuppositional project."
You cannot simply toss aside hypotheticals that you don't like in a discussion on whether or not an argument logically necessitates something. Choi is giving a hypothetical scenario in which the TAG would not necessitate the existence of the Christian God. In other words he is disproving the TAG. You shouldn't simply say, well that hypothetical scenario is only hypothetical. LOGIC deals in hypotheticals. If you are unwilling to consider hypothetical scenarios then you are unwilling to give an honest critique of a logical argument. Either Choi's argument is an example of a defect in the TAG or not. If not explain why it isn't. If so, admit defeat. Don't just ignore the hypo.
"Second, and much more substantial, Choi has failed to provided a coherent worldview to account for intelligibility. The worldview that Choi sets forth is identical to Christianity with one major alteration, the Trinity is gone. But what Choi does not understand that worldviews are not disconnected propositions—as if one doctrine can be changed and the system remains largely in tack. Instead, worldviews are organic. One part flows into the other. By changing one part the whole system will change. Thus, if the doctrine of the Trinity is changed the entire worldview is altered. Take for instance the doctrine of the Scripture. The Christian worldview teaches that the Bible is the final and complete revelation from God about himself. If the Trinity were altered, the Christian Bible would have to be altered significantly to make room for the “quadrinity.” At the very least, sections would have to be added introducing us to this fourth person. Or take the doctrine of salvation; it would have to be changed. As it stands, Christianity holds that all three person of the Trinity are directly involved in the salvation of God’s people—the Father chooses his people, the Son dies for his people and the Holy Spirit sanctifies his people. If a fourth person were added to the Godhead, a role for this person would need to be added to the doctrine of salvation. These are but a few of the many examples that could be given to show that adding the “quadrinity” is not as nice and neat as Choi would like it to be and as such, Choi fails to understand the organic nature of worldviews."
Once again, it's a hypothetical scenario. Further, just as Choi has not layed out a theory of EVERYTHING that exists in reality and how it relates to everything else in reality... you have not shown how adding an extra person in the trinity into the equation affects anything either. You ought to consider his hypothetical rather than simply writing it off, or saying that you'll consider it when he postulates every aspect of an alternate reality that would take all of eternity to postulate.