Response to Critics of the TAG
With this brief outline of the transcendental TAG, we can turn to the main objective of this paper, which is a response to critics of this argument. In this section a response will be given to two main critics of the TAG: (1) Michael Martin, atheist professor Emeritus of Philosophy at
a. A Brief Response to “Does Induction Presume the Existence of the Christian God?”[1]
Martin begins his discussion of the transcendental argument by giving an overview of the TAG. His overview is not one of the strongest overviews on the subject, but he does hit the essence of the presuppositional argument.
The basic idea of TAG when used against atheists is easy to understand and state. It maintains that certain things that atheists assume are true can only be true if there is a God. Primarily these atheistic assumptions are the beliefs that logical reasoning is possible, that scientific inference is justified, and that objective moral standards exist. So if an atheist uses logic to refute a theistic argument, uses scientific evidence to undermine some biblical position, or argues that God’s omnipotence and moral perfection are incompatible with evil in the world and consequently that God does not exist, TAG maintains that he or she is implicitly assuming God’s existence.[2]
After Martin’s overview of the TAG, he moves to a response to this argument. His main point is that even if the transcendental argument is sound it fails to show that the Christian God exists. He states the argument in this form, “To say that A presupposes B is to say that we could not ‘make sense’ of A without assuming B. However, supposing we grant that one must assume B to make sense of A, it does not follow that B is true.”[3] Martin is right here, however, this is not the claim made by the TAG. The TAG adds that everyone accepts “B” to be the case. This is why the TAG is so forceful. But Martin misses this point and it is seen in his counter example: “For example, if I am trying to communicate to an audience by speaking to them in English, my action makes no sense unless they understand English. But it does not follow that they do. They might only understand Chinese.”[4] Martin’s example illustrates that he has missed the weight of the transcendental argument. First, in the example given by Martin, the person speaking in English, in order to communicate (which is a speakers primary goal), must assume that the hearers know English. To apply this to the realm of the transcendental argument, if a person uses induction then that person must assume the Christian God. Martin fails to see that the very example he uses helps support the presuppositional argument. For if the communicator did not believe that his audience spoke English, he would not be speaking it. Granted, this does not mean that the audience does speak English (or God exists), but it does mean that the speaker believes this to be the case. To apply this to our situation, the non-Christian, must think that the Christian God is real in order to uses, say, induction.
Second, the claim made by the transcendental argument is not only that the non-Christian believes in the Christian God (which the transcendental argument does claim), but that the Christian God must be true in order for induction, or any other fact, to be true. Martin’s counter example fails to address the full claim of the transcendental argument. In other words, his counter example does not do justice to what the TAG is trying to address. Martin has set up a rather easy straw man to knock down. If Martin wanted to uses a better analogy (or illustration) for the TAG, the following would work better. The speaker in standing on a stage in front of an audience and the whole point of his speech is way he is not standing on a stage. The speaker is standing on the very thing he is attempting to deny.
Again, Martin fails, as he does many times in this article, to see the weightiness of the transcendental argument. In addition to this, Martin says, “[The transcendental argument] would not establish the truth of the Christian worldview but only the inconsistency of atheists [non-Christians] who presuppose science, logic and objective ethics.”[5] This statement by Martin fails to understand that the strongest logical argument that can be made in favor of a proposition is reductio ad absurdum. That is to say, that demonstrative proof for p can be made by assuming ~p and showing that a contradiction follows, thus proving the truth of p. But Martin assumes that this form of argument, reductio ad absurdum, does not prove anything; rather only shows the falseness of atheism. Martin is wrong in this assumption, and thus by admitting that if the transcendental argument is true the atheist would be inconsistent, he shows that this is a positive proof for the Christian worldview.
b. A Brief Response to “The Transcendental Argument for the Non Existence of God”[6]
Martin endeavors to show that the truth of logic, science and morality presuppose the falsehood of Christianity. “I will show how one can argue exactly the opposite conclusion [of the TAG], namely, that logic, science and morality presuppose the falsehood of the Christian world view or at least the falsehood of the interpretation of his world view.”[7] Martin’s best transcendental argument for the nonexistence of God is based on the law of logic.
Consider logic. Logic presupposes that its principles are necessarily true. However, according to the brand of Christianity assumed by TAG, God created everything, including logic; or at least everything, including logic, is dependent on God. But if something is created by or is dependent on God, it is not necessary—it is contingent on God. And if principles of logic are contingent on God, they are not logically necessary. Moreover, if the principles of logic are contingent on God, God could change them. Thus, God could make the law of noncontradiction false; in other words, God could arrange matters so that a proposition and its negation were true at the same time. But this is absurd.
There is no disagreement that the principles of logic are necessary, in fact, the necessity of logic is one of the arguments for God. But they are necessary for humans, not God. This is a fundamental problem in Martin’s worldview. He seems to think that God is a creature, as he is, and as such that God is bound (if he exists) to logic. This is the exact opposite of what is claimed by the Christian worldview. God is the creator and we are his creature. This is a fundamental metaphysical distinction in the Christian concept of reality. The “Eimi/eikon” distinction is central to the way the universe is ordered.
We must, then, begin with this basic and fundamental distinction—the Eimi/eikon distinction—the distention of the “I am” and his image. If we begin in that way, then all of our discussion about “reality,” “individuality,” “externality,” “objectivity,” “knowledge,” “truth,” and the like has that distinction as its context and as its defining character.[8]
Martin fails to understand this central principle of the Christian faith. His unbelieving worldview leads him in this direction, and on one level he cannot be faulted for the conclusions he comes to. However, on another level, he misses this critical distinction and as such misses the whole point of the TAG and can be faulted for misunderstanding the argument he is trying to engage. Though his argument is original, it fails to do any substantial damage to the presupposition argument because he fails to see the “Eimi/eikon” distinction, which leads him to wrongly conclude that God would be held in subjection to logic.
c. A Brief Response to “The Transcendental Argument”[9]
Unlike Martin, Choi does a much better job of setting forth the TAG. However, his criticisms still fall short. Choi’s criticism of the TAG demonstrates that he understands the ‘heart’ of the TAG when he argues that: “It is possible that: there is a worldview distinct from Christian theism and which is such that if it were true, it would provide a sufficient justification for the laws of logic.”[10] In arguing this way, Choi basically grants the validity of the TAG,[11] but he argues that the primes that states the Christian God is the only way to account for intelligibility is false. Choi does this by attempting to provide another worldview that would satisfy the preconditions for intelligibility.
As a specific illustration of such a worldview, consider Fristianity, which is a theistic worldview that holds to the doctrine of the quadrinity (one God in four persons) and is otherwise identical to Christianity, or as similar to Christianity as possible (given its qaudrinitarian tenet).[12]
Thus, Choi offer “Fristianity” as an alternative worldview to Christianity that, as he claims, would account for the preconditions for intelligibility. This argument is not substantial to the TAG for at least two reasons. First, we are not concerned about hypothetical worldviews that can be made up to fit the preconditions; rather, we are interested in actual worldviews. In other words, the TAG is concerned with actual worldviews that can stand this criticism. If no one holds to “Fristianity”, at the end of the day, it is really irrelevant to the presuppositional project.
Second, and much more substantial, Choi has failed to provided a coherent worldview to account for intelligibility. The worldview that Choi sets forth is identical to Christianity with one major alteration, the Trinity is gone. But what Choi does not understand that worldviews are not disconnected propositions—as if one doctrine can be changed and the system remains largely in tack. Instead, worldviews are organic. One part flows into the other. By changing one part the whole system will change. Thus, if the doctrine of the Trinity is changed the entire worldview is altered. Take for instance the doctrine of the Scripture. The Christian worldview teaches that the Bible is the final and complete revelation from God about himself. If the Trinity were altered, the Christian Bible would have to be altered significantly to make room for the “quadrinity.” At the very least, sections would have to be added introducing us to this fourth person. Or take the doctrine of salvation; it would have to be changed. As it stands, Christianity holds that all three person of the Trinity are directly involved in the salvation of God’s people—the Father chooses his people, the Son dies for his people and the Holy Spirit sanctifies his people. If a fourth person were added to the Godhead, a role for this person would need to be added to the doctrine of salvation. These are but a few of the many examples that could be given to show that adding the “quadrinity” is not as nice and neat as Choi would like it to be and as such, Choi fails to understand the organic nature of worldviews.
[1] Martin, Michael. “Does Induction Presume the Existence of the Christian God?” Skeptic Vol. 5, #2: 71-75.
[2] Ibid., 72.
[3] Ibid., 72.
[4] Ibid., 73.
[5] Ibid., 73.
[6] Martin, Michael. “The Transcendental Argument for the Nonexistence of God.” 1996. [April 30, 2008.].
[7] Ibid., pp. 1
[8] Scott Oliphint, Reasons for Faith: Philosophy in the service of Theology (
[9]Choi. “The Transcendental Argument.”
[10] Choi. “The Transcendental Argument.” 243.
[11] In fact, from page 236 to 242 Choi goes to length to show a valid form of the TAG.
[12] Choi. “The Transcendental Argument.” 243 (emphasis mine)
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