His chapter on the extent of the atonement is one of the best. In this chapter he takes head on those who claim that Christ died to make salvation possible—a so-called ‘hypothetical universalism.’ He sets his theological arsenal directly at those who use the seemingly universalistic passages and shows that this is a false understanding. He concludes that the very glory of the cross is at stake. Those who claim that Christ did not secure the salivation of the elect on the cross are diminishing the glory of Christ. If Christ did not die in a unique way for the elect, then the cross loses its splendor. He concludes this chapter with these poignant words:
We can readily see, therefore, that although universal terms are sometimes used in connection with the atonement these terms cannot be appealed to as establishing the doctrine of universal atonement. In some cases, as we have found, it can be shown that all-inclusive universalism is excluded by the considerations of the immediate context. In other cases there are adequate reasons why universal terms should be used without the implication of distributively universal extent. Hence no conclusive support for the doctrine of universal atonement can be derived from universalistic expressions. The question must be determined on the basis of other evidence. This evidence we have tired to present. It is easy for the proponents of universal atonement to make offhand appeal to a few texts. But this method is not worthy of the serious student of Scripture. It is necessary for us to discover what redemption or atonement really means. And when we examine the Scripture we find that the glory of the cross of Christ is bound up with the effectiveness of its accomplishment. Christ redeemed us to God by his blood, he gave himself a ransom that he might deliver us from iniquity. The atonement is efficacious substitution.
"And when we examine the Scripture we find that the glory of the cross of Christ is bound up with the effectiveness of its accomplishment. "
ReplyDeleteThe effectiveness of its accomplishment? How is electing only some people when you could easily elect all people, an effective accomplishment? A truly "effective" cross would elect everyone.
There are two things at issue here.
ReplyDeleteFirst, you are mixing up election and the atonement. Electing some or electing all does not make the cross effective.
Second, by the phrase "effectiveness of its accomplishment" Murray means that the cross actually accomplishes its intended goal--the salvation of the elect. Now, both of us limit the cross. I limit it in its scope--that is, it is limited in who it is intended for. You limit the cross in its power--that is, it is limited in what it can accomplish.
The view that Murray and I hold to is that the cross actually saves people. The cross has a real effect on people and their salvation--it brings about their salvation.
I hope this clears things up.
You did bring up another issue that is not on point with this post and that is "why did God not elect everyone for salvation?" We can discuss this issue if you want. But it would be best, for this issue, for me to start a new post on this topic. If you want me to do that, I will. But for this post let us stick to the atonement and not election, granted they are closely related.
Ok I get it... so the glory of the cross is in effectively accomplishing very little. Way to set the bar high Jesus!
ReplyDeleteYou have the same problem, Heretic, simply in different terms. You claim that the cross accomplished "very little" in our view. But look at what YOUR view demonstrates: God tries and (almost all of the time) fails to save people because their wills are just such powerful impediments. This is definitely something we on the Reformed end would consider far less than adequate.
ReplyDeleteOkay, so we both agree, then, that not everyone is going to Heaven (assuming you're not a universalist). Now, we can all agree we'd love to know that everyone will be saved. You're very disappointed that God didn't save everyone. But your appreciation for God's character, I would submit, is very two-dimensional. You want a loving, happy, pleasant God. But if you could only see that God wants to be known in ALL of His ways: just, defending His name, punishing evil, and (yes) saving those who don't deserve to be saved. These are all pieces of a much larger picture of who God is. Part of God's glory is in communicating these realities about Himself to us in their fullness. This means knowing the difficult consequences of sin as well as the dizzying heights of being redeemed.
God has intentionally saved some, and He has intentionally given justice to the rest. You can accuse Him of no wrongdoing in any of this, and you know it.
"God tries and (almost all of the time) fails to save people because their wills are just such powerful impediments."
ReplyDeleteAnd of course you know that I would never say that. God does not try to save everyone or else he'd have accomplished it. He effectively makes a donative offer to everyone, unfortunately not everyone accepts.
A gift requires donative intent, actual or constructive delivery, lack of consideration, and acceptance. Obviously the intent to make the gift (donative intent) is present. The actual or constructive delivery of the gift is present, (Jesus death on the cross), lack of consideration (meaning that the person does not exchange something for the gift - Jesus death was not a bargained for exchange. He freely gave his life in return for nothing), and acceptance. (Jesus gift of taking your sins upon himself may be actually delivered, but without acceptance it is no gift at all. A gift cannot be thrust upon someone against his/her will.)
"You want a loving, happy, pleasant God. But if you could only see that God wants to be known in ALL of His ways: just, defending His name, punishing evil, and (yes) saving those who don't deserve to be saved. These are all pieces of a much larger picture of who God is. Part of God's glory is in communicating these realities about Himself to us in their fullness. This means knowing the difficult consequences of sin as well as the dizzying heights of being redeemed."
I make the same arguement directed at your theology. You fail to take in the whole picture of who God is. You say, "look how merciful our God is that he would allow people to be saved who don't deserve to be saved". (Note, I'm not using quotes to indicate a direct quote. I'm using them to make the sentence less confusing.) Yet, you ignore the fact that predestining some to be sinners and others to be saved is inherantly unjust. True mercy is not punishing those who are ACTUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN ACTIONS. Not punishing those who never freely chose to do evil in the first place isn't mercy at all. It's a sham. It's a shell game. It's a politician's spin. It's not mercy. And punishing those same people would definately not be giving them justice. You accuse me of failing to recognize the entire person/character of God. I accuse you of the same.
"God has intentionally saved some, and He has intentionally given justice to the rest. You can accuse Him of no wrongdoing in any of this, and you know it."
Yes under your theology he has intentionally saved same. But what has he saved them from? He's saved them FROM HIS OWN ARBITRARY ELECTION, as if this were somehow a praiseworthy action. Such action is no more praiseworthy than the action of serial killer who SAVES several of his victims by freeing them while he rapes and murders the rest. He certainly has NOT given justice to the rest. He has given justice to no one. You can only give justice to someone responsible for his own actions. However, he HAS given INJUSTICE to plenty of people, and I certainly CAN accuse such a God of wrongdoing. In fact I can accuse him of the ultimate wrongdoing. Take every sin ever committed and trace it back to the original source, the God of your theology. Such a God atones for no one. He's in need of atonement himself.
You said, "Yet, you ignore the fact that predestining some to be sinners and others to be saved is inherantly unjust."
ReplyDeleteWhat is this standard of justice you are using to judge God's actions as just or unjust?
"You accuse me of failing to recognize the entire person/character of God. I accuse you of the same."
ReplyDeleteActually, you really didn't. All you did was demonstrate for me that you don't understand what Compatiblistic Freedom is, even after taking three hundred classes where Josh and I spelled Compatiblism out so clearly that you have no excuse for disregarding it here.
You claim that our system leaves God responsible for mens' actions. This demonstrates exactly what I am talking about. If I am going to argue against your theological system, for example, I think it is only proper for me to refute your notion of freedom instead of simply assuming that it is wrong. Given the definition of freedom which I hold to (i.e. Freedom: "Being able to do whatever one desires at any given time"), all of the charges you level against the Calvinist in your response pose no real challenge.
You claim that "predestining some to be sinners and others to be saved is inherently unjust." Again, however, given compatiblistic freedom (which can be demonstrated both through reason and exposition of the Scriptures) your objection is, again, nullified. And I already stated that if a sinner is sent to Hell by God, justice is done. If a Christian is sent to heaven, justice was also done by Christ on his behalf. The Christian, in this case, received mercy. There is nothing unjust about giving to some what they deserve and giving mercy to others.
"Such action is no more praiseworthy than the action of serial killer who SAVES several of his victims by freeing them while he rapes and murders the rest."
So in your illustration, God is a serial killer. Has it ever occurred to you that, from a Scriptural standpoint, it is on record that God has caused a lot of evil in the world? I was going to offer a complete thought here, but instead I'm going to put a new blog post of some old material of mine. Clearly, we have some massive misunderstandings going on, here.
Do I need to do a post on compatiblistic freedom? Because all of your arguments are hinging on your assumption of libertarian freedom. We're talking past each other, until then.
"Actually, you really didn't. All you did was demonstrate for me that you don't understand what Compatiblistic Freedom is, even after taking three hundred classes where Josh and I spelled Compatiblism out so clearly that you have no excuse for disregarding it here."
ReplyDeleteOh, no it's not that I disregard it as if I fail to understand it. It's that there's no such thing. It's that I completely reject the very idea.
"Clearly, we have some massive misunderstandings going on, here."
There's no misunderstanding. I reject that compatiblism is a proper measure of human freedom. You can't have libertarian free will and predestination. They are incompatible. You can say you have compatibalistic free will all you want, but it's meaningless. It doesn't even come up to the level of bone-tossing. Freedom to do as you please when you don't actually choose what you please is no freedom at all.
"So in your illustration, God is a serial killer?"
In my illustration, your VERSION of God (a version that does not exist) is WORSE EVEN than a cereal killer. (He is after all responsible for every cereal killing to ever occur under your theory.) I'll answer the rest of the posts later. I'm late for class.
"What is this standard of justice you are using to judge God's actions as just or unjust?"
ReplyDeleteJustice is to give to each person as he deserves. Each person deserves to be punished for certain actions which he freely chooses. If man is predestined to some action, he does not freely choose that action (obviously I reject the idea of compatablistic freedom and am holding to a libertarian definition of freedom) and therefore it is not just to punish him for those actions. It is ESPECIALLY clear that it is not just for a person to punish another for those actions that the other did not freely choose where one actually forced those actions upon the other person. Example: If predestination is true, then it is not just for the state to punish person X for murder, because person X did not freely choose to murder. If predestination is true, then it is ESPECIALLY clear that it is not just for GOD to punish person X for murder if GOD is the one that predestined that person X would commit murder (there are other versions of predestination after all, such as mechanistic determinism, etc...), because not only would God be punishing person X for something that person X did not freely choose... but God would also be punishing person X for something that GOD HIMSELF freely chose.. (Whereas the state would only be punishing for something that GOD freely chose for person X.)
"If I am going to argue against your theological system, for example, I think it is only proper for me to refute your notion of freedom instead of simply assuming that it is wrong."
ReplyDeleteThis is a presuppositional argument where the only way for me to prove that my definition of freedom is correct is by circularly using the law of identity, excluded middle, and noncontradiction. So, your definition of freedom is not correct and I can prove that is the case because my definition of freedom is correct and is inconsistent with your definition (law of noncontradiction), and also I can prove that my definition of freedom is correct because it is the correct definition (law of identity), and because since there are only two possible definitions and yours is wrong (because as I've already stated mine is correct and is in conflict with yours), then mine must be correct and yours wrong (law of excluded middle),etc...
Other than that, you shouldn't expect any other kind of proof in regards to a presuppositional argument just as I don't expect you to prove that yours is correct or mine incorrect. I don't expect anything less than that you turn the argument around and use the exact same argument against me, and that you have no other way of arguing the matter. Only if you did that it wouldn't matter because mine is still the correct definition and yours is not.
"You can't have libertarian free will and predestination. They are incompatible." That's right. LIBERTARIAN free will. Free will in a compatiblistic model IS compatible with predestination, as I am about to demonstrate. Really, then, I must demonstrate for you that Libertarian free will is an incoherent notion, otherwise I really am (as you seems to accuse me of) throwing up my version of freedom against yours, thus bringing us to a draw. I will, therefore, soon be doing a blog on the subject of the incoherence of Libertarian free will.
ReplyDelete"Freedom to do as you please when you don't actually choose what you please is no freedom at all." Exactly. Apparently, however, you believe that in the compatiblistic model, people are forced by God to do things they do not please. This simply isn't so. Given our definition of freedom, doing whatever you desire at any given moment IS freedom. To do whatever you want. Now, this is irrespective of the ultimate ground of that choice, and that is why our definition of freedom is so important to maintaining coherence between God's predestining our actions and God's holding us responsible. As long as we are the ones willing (regardless of WHY we will) we are held responsible. Now, your statement that "Freedom to do as you please when you don't actually choose what you please is no freedom at all" seems to confirm for me that you agree that freedom is being able to do what you want at any given moment. Am I correct to derive this from your words? If so, we may have a common definition of freedom to proceed with.
"You can say you have compatibalistic free will all you want, but it's meaningless. It doesn't even come up to the level of bone-tossing." I want to put forward a simple and clear challenge. Libertarian freedom is an incoherent notion because it proposes that the will can be self-generating, operating independent of previous causation. Given the Libertarian model of freedom, people must be free to do otherwise, but in a world where God knows future events and decisions, such will always be impossible, because nothing could ever possibly be otherwise that what God perfectly knows will come to pass. Furthermore, even if divine foreknowledge is excluded from the picture, there is a much larger problem with your position: the possibility of a volition existing without a cause. This is something I will address in the aforementioned blog I am preparing.
You should know I am not merely satisfied with assuming compatiblistic freedom and thinking that is sufficient. But you, likewise, may not simply assume libertarian freedom and scream "But there's no such thing as compatiblism. It doesn't make any sense to me because I think like a Libertarian!" You must demonstrate that compatiblism is neither biblically nor philosophically cogent if your stand is going to be made where you appear to be making it. let me suggest that the direction of this conversation seems to be such that we may want to take up this topic on the new blog I am about to post.
heretic,
ReplyDeleteIf I understand you right, you defined justice as "to give to each person as he deserves." If I have missed you, nothing else I say will be of any benefit.
First, I agree with you on your understanding of justice, but who decides what we deserve? You seem to imply that we decided. I say this because if God decides, then no matter what he does, it is just. But you seemed to imply that God could be unjust in doing this or that to a sinner.
Second, in your reply you assume your view to be right. You do this on a number of occasions, here is but one, "If man is predestined to some action, he does not freely choose that action." As you know this is simply not what we hold to. If you come into the discussion assuming your view to be right, you will do NOTHING to gain an ear to listen to you. In other word, if you want to influence us to your view, you need to argue for your view and not just assume it.
Third, your view is that if man could not have done otherwise, then there is no ground on which to judge them as guilty. This is simply untrue. Let me explain by an example, we both would say that if a person is driving like a maniac, then the cop can rightfully give him a ticket and a judge can rightfully punish him. Thus far there should be no disagreement. But let us say that the man is drunk. We both should still say that he should be punished. But he could not have done otherwise. His drunken state makes it so he could not do otherwise. Thus, he could not have driven properly, but it is right to punish him.
You might retort that the man could have chosen to not get drunk and thus, he could have done otherwise. The problem with this is that the drunk state is analogous to the fallen state we are created in and we could not do otherwise in that. Thus, if you want to undermined our view, you need to get ride of original sin.
"Thus, if you want to undermined our view, you need to get rid of original sin." The Pelagians, realizing this same problem, have already done exactly that. If Heretic is that committed to Libertarian freedom, he will do the same thing, eventually, if he hasn't done it already.
ReplyDeleteAdam,
ReplyDeleteThere is no doubt that heretic might very well give up or has already given up original sin. I was only wanting to point out the lengthens that one must go to in order to hold to a so called "Free will."
"Exactly. Apparently, however, you believe that in the compatiblistic model, people are forced by God to do things they do not please."
ReplyDeleteNo, you should read my statment again. I believe that in the compatibilistic model people are forced to please something. I don't believe that they are forced to do other than what they please, I believe that they are forced to please a certain way, and that this is not true freedom. (Libertarian freedom.)
"Given the Libertarian model of freedom, people must be free to do otherwise, but in a world where God knows future events and decisions, such will always be impossible, because nothing could ever possibly be otherwise that what God perfectly knows will come to pass."
The foreknowledge argrugment to predistanation confuses the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent. But we've had this discussion before.
"Now, your statement that "Freedom to do as you please when you don't actually choose what you please is no freedom at all" seems to confirm for me that you agree that freedom is being able to do what you want at any given moment. Am I correct to derive this from your words? If so, we may have a common definition of freedom to proceed with."
WHAT? How could you possibly get that from my statement? Why would I argue against compatibilistic freedom by using a compatabilistic definition of freedom? Obviously I have to critique compatibilistic freedom from a libertarian freedom perspective. No way would I ever agree to use a compatibilist definition of freedom. So we definately can NOT settle on a common definition of freedom and any argument that you make that begins from such a definition is already doomed to fail from the start.
"You must demonstrate that compatiblism is neither biblically nor philosophically cogent if your stand is going to be made where you appear to be making it"
I disagree. I don't need to demonstrate anything. Such an endeavor is impossible with a presuppositional argument. I need only demonstrate that my philosophy is consistent and assert that it is correct, in order to prove that yours is false.
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ReplyDeleteIf I understand you right, you defined justice as "to give to each person as he deserves."
ReplyDeleteYes, and before we move on I feel I should probably point out that a person can only deserve what he freely chooses to deserve.
"First, I agree with you on your understanding of justice, but who decides what we deserve? You seem to imply that we decided. I say this because if God decides, then no matter what he does, it is just. But you seemed to imply that God could be unjust in doing this or that to a sinner."
Given that a person only deserves what he freely chooses to deserve, if God punished or rewarded in accordance with what HE decided that we deserve, then God would be unjust.
"As you know this is simply not what we hold to. If you come into the discussion assuming your view to be right, you will do NOTHING to gain an ear to listen to you. In other word, if you want to influence us to your view, you need to argue for your view and not just assume it."
I definately know that you don't hold to libertarian free will, and you misunderstand my intent if you think I participate in presuppositional discussions to persuade. I participate to educate. I don't care about persuading people to libertarian free will. I only care about pointing out that it is reality, and that it is a fallacy to ignore it. It's impossible to persuade when starting from conflicting presuppositions, and I refuse to pretend do it and don't expect you to pretend to do it either.
"Let me explain by an example, we both would say that if a person is driving like a maniac, then the cop can rightfully give him a ticket and a judge can rightfully punish him. Thus far there should be no disagreement. But let us say that the man is drunk. We both should still say that he should be punished. But he could not have done otherwise. His drunken state makes it so he could not do otherwise. Thus, he could not have driven properly, but it is right to punish him."
Oh come on. You can do better than that! Obviously I'm going to point out that the person freely chose to get drunk. Now the extent of the punishment might depend upon how likely the later action is to result from the former and various other factors, such as if a person freely chose to leave the top off of a bottle of cyanide in his house for 3 minutes and a burglar comes in and drinks it thinking that it's a beer v. if a person left a top off a bottle of cyanide in a church nursury for three minutes and a little kid drinks it, etc...
If you want a truly analogize scenario, let's talk about a person who doesn't choose his impairment... let's say a person has a seizure while driving and plows into a truck. The law does not hold a person responsible for something like that as it shouldn't, since a person ought not to be held responsible for an action that he did not freely choose.
"You might retort that the man could have chosen to not get drunk and thus, he could have done otherwise. The problem with this is that the drunk state is analogous to the fallen state we are created in and we could not do otherwise in that. Thus, if you want to undermined our view, you need to get ride of original sin."
Ha ha. I'm sorry it's amusing me so much for some reason. Really, did we choose the fallen state we were created in? Hadn't realized that. Choosing to get drunk is NOT analogous at all, because we don't CHOOSE to be born into sin.
But you're right that in order to be consistent I need to reject the doctrine of original sin, although it doesn't follow from your analogy, it does still follow from my philosophy. I do reject the doctrine of original sin. Didn't you know that already? That's the reason I thought it would be funny to call myself "the heretic" on here.
You said, “I should probably point out that a person can only deserve what he freely chooses to deserve.”
ReplyDeleteWhat in the world does that mean???? It is so far from reality that I cannot even understand it. A murderer deserves to be punished even if they do not freely choose to be punished. You comment is so off the mark that I fear either 1) I completely do not understand you or 2) you miss spoke.
On to my illustration about the drunk…
First, it is completely irrelevant that the man ‘freely chose’ to be drunk. The point still stands that while he was driving he could not do otherwise and thus he could not be punished. He could be punished for getting drunk, but not driving poorly. You cannot push the problem back. You whole view of freedom rests on the idea that at any given moment a person must be able to do otherwise or they cannot be responsible. I gave a clear example where a person could not do otherwise and yet they are still responsible.
Second, a person who has a seizure is not morally responsible for car crash. However, my view is nothing like a person having a seizure. In my view, people make real decisions. They are not ‘asleep at the wheel.’ Sure God is in control of their decisions, but they are nonetheless their decisions.
I find it a bit disheartening that you do not want to go to the texts of the Bible. The Bible is the source of all truth. The reason I hold the views I do is not primarily because they make good sense (which they do) but because they are the views expressed by the sacred texts of holy writ.
Let me second what Walker just said about turning to scripture for our doctrine. I find it reinforces my own position that you say that your position is a philosophical construct rather than a result of scriptural exegesis. I hope you will interact with my example of Absalom and David's wives in this regard.
ReplyDeleteI also think that those who read this blog do need to keep in mind that you do, in fact, deny original sin, because I think it is very relevant to our discussion.